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Abstract
Veriﬁcation and Validation (V&V) is a critically important phase in the development life cycle of
a simulation model. In the context of network simulation, traditional network simulators perform well in
using a simulation model for evaluating/predicting the performance of a network protocol but lack the
capability of verifying the “correctness” of the simulation model being used. To address this problem,
we have extended J-Sim — an open-source component-based network simulator written entirely in Java
— with a state space exploration capability that explores the (entire) state space created by a network
simulation model in order to ﬁnd an execution (if any) that violates an assertion; i.e., a safety property.
In this paper, we elaborate on the state space exploration framework in J-Sim and demonstrate
its usefulness and eﬀectiveness in verifying complicated simulation models. Speciﬁcally, we verify the
simulation models of two widely used and fairly complex network protocols: the Ad-Hoc On-Demand
Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol for wireless ad hoc networks and the directed diﬀusion data
dissemination protocol for wireless sensor networks. To enable the veriﬁcation of these fairly complex
network simulation models, we make use of structural properties in the underlying state space along two
orthogonal dimensions; the ﬁrst uses a non-trivial simulation relation to prune the states to be searched,
and the second is state ranking that determines whether a state is “better than” another in order to enable
the implementation of a best-ﬁrst search (BeFS). We also develop protocol-speciﬁc search heuristics to
guide state space exploration towards ﬁnding assertion violations in less time. In particular, we report
ﬁndings on how to devise good search heuristics for routing/data dissemination protocols similar to AODV
and directed diﬀusion. We also show that the time needed to ﬁnd an assertion violation by our state
space exploration framework in J-Sim is comparable to that of Java PathFinder (JPF), a state-of-the-art
model checker for Java programs.1
1 Introduction
Veriﬁcation and Validation (V&V) is an important and integral part of the development of sim-
ulation models. A model is, by deﬁnition, an abstract representation of a real (existing or proposed)
system built for the purpose of studying the system according to certain objectives. In particular, the
conceptual model is a mathematical/logical/verbal representation of the system. In order to conduct
simulation experiments on a model of a real-world system, the model is usually implemented in a simu-
1Preliminary versions of this paper appeared in [59, 62]. This paper contains more detailed explanations, more search
techniques, more experiments, and the comparison with JPF.
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lation software on a computer; i.e., turning the conceptual model into a computerized model. Validation
addresses the question of “Are we building the right model?” and veriﬁcation addresses the question of
“Are we building the model right?”. The process of building, verifying and validating a simulation model
is iterative and may have to be repeated several times until a certain level of credibility in the model
(and the information derived from it) is achieved.
Some of the V&V methods are informal subjective comparisons between the output of the (comput-
erized) model and the output of the real system; some are formal objective procedures based on statistical
techniques such as hypothesis testing or conﬁdence intervals. Examples of V&V techniques are: (1) face
validity, (2) checking the model assumptions (both structural assumptions of how the system operates
and data assumptions of the input data), (3) sensitivity analysis, (4) driving the simulation model with
historical data or samples from distributions and comparing the model input-output transformations to
corresponding input-output transformations for the real system, (5) Turing tests, (6) using a simulation
trace, (7) fault/failure insertion testing, (8) extreme input testing, and (9) static and dynamic testing of
the computerized model. See [2–6, 39] for several veriﬁcation and validation techniques.
As indicated by Sargent in [55], there is no set of speciﬁc tests that can be easily applied to
determine the “correctness” of a simulation model and that no algorithm exists to determine what
techniques or procedures to use. In this paper, we elaborate on a technique that is complementary
to existing techniques and can be used in combination with them. Speciﬁcally, we present the design,
implementation and evaluation of a framework that aids in the veriﬁcation of a network simulation
model by directly executing the model along several execution paths and checking whether the model
satisﬁes certain assertions (i.e., safety properties) that the real system satisﬁes. As pointed out by Balci
et al. in [6], computer-aided support for veriﬁcation, validation, and accreditation (VV&A) is one of
the strategic directions to achieve VV&A. Our framework facilitates this computer-aided support by
providing the assertion checking V&V technique [5] along several execution paths in the state space.
The motivation of our work is that network simulators have been used for decades to build a model
of a network protocol and evaluate its performance under diﬀerent scenarios. One major deﬁciency of
traditional network simulators, however, is that they only evaluate/predict the performance of network
protocols in the scenarios provided by the user (e.g., a network protocol designer or a simulation modeler)
but can not exhaustively analyze all possible scenarios for correctness. For example, a network simulator
can use a simulation model of a routing protocol to conduct experiments and evaluate the performance of
this protocol, but cannot check whether the simulation model being used may suﬀer from routing loops.
If the assertion violations in the simulation model do not appear (and hence cannot be investigated) in
the scenarios studied, they may not be identiﬁed as early as possible. If an assertion violation exists
in the simulation model, the results obtained from the simulation experiments may be incorrect and
may lead to wrong decision making. Furthermore, if the simulation model models a nonexisting system,
undiscovered assertion violations in the simulation model may eventually manifest themselves only after
the system has been implemented and deployed. In the light of recent research [54] that creates a
physical implementation of a network protocol from existing simulation code without much modiﬁcation,
the consequence of leaving assertion violations undiscovered in the simulation code is especially severe.
Therefore, building an integrated environment that allows the user to both verify a simulation model and
use it to evaluate/predict performance is an important task.
Motivated thus, we have extended J-Sim [34]—an open-source component-based network simu-
lation environment written entirely in Java—with the state space exploration capability that explores
the (entire) state space created by a network simulation model, up to a conﬁgurable maximum depth in
order to ﬁnd violations of a safety property (e.g., the absence of routing loops) if any exists. Speciﬁcally,
we have implemented a state space explorer (written in Java for seamless integration with J-Sim), and
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incorporated it into J-Sim. The basic idea is to execute the simulation model along several execution
paths in order to pinpoint assertion violations. However, the challenge is how to enable the state space
explorer to take control of the network simulation model to explore the (entire) state space, rather than
simply exploring one single execution path (i.e., sequence of events) as J-Sim traditionally does. More-
over, this has to be done without requiring the core design and implementation of J-Sim to be altered
and without degrading the execution time of the J-Sim simulation model if the user is only interested in
using the model for performance evaluation purposes. In Section 3, we explain how we have overcome
that challenge.
After the state space exploration framework is laid, we demonstrate the usefulness, eﬀectiveness,
and generality of our framework in verifying the simulation models of two widely used and fairly complex
network protocols: the Ad-Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol [50, 51] for wireless
ad hoc networks and the directed diﬀusion data dissemination protocol [33] for wireless sensor networks.
These are reasonably complex network protocols whose J-Sim simulation models (not including the J-Sim
library) have about 1200 and 1400 lines of code, respectively. (As a proof-of-concept case study, we veriﬁed
the simulation model of an automatic repeat request (ARQ) protocol, also known as the alternating bit
protocol, in [59].) Our choice of AODV and directed diﬀusion in this paper is motivated by their potential
to become representative routing and data dissemination protocols, respectively, in ad hoc networks and
sensor networks. We investigate whether these simulation models satisfy the loop-free safety property,
i.e., data packets are not routed through loops.
To analyze such large simulation models of real network protocols, we make use of algorithms
and heuristics that exploit structural properties salient in the state space of message passing systems in
general, and some network protocols in particular. The ﬁrst technique exploits the existence of a non-
trivial simulation relation (in the process algebraic sense) between states to reduce the search space. The
idea is as follows. A traditional state space exploration tool performs a classical search algorithm (like
depth-ﬁrst or breadth-ﬁrst search) on the directed graph of states and transitions deﬁned by the protocol,
choosing to terminate certain branches of the search when it visits a state previously encountered. We
observe that this basic algorithm is sound even when branches of the search are terminated whenever
a state s is visited that can be simulated by another state s′ that has been explored before, not just
when the same state is re-encountered, i.e., whenever there is some previously visited state s′ that can
exhibit every behavior of s; the formal deﬁnition of simulation is deferred to technical sections. This can
drastically reduce the search space, if the simulation relation is good. Next, we observe that, when the
communication between network entities is unreliable (i.e., when message delivery is neither guaranteed
nor ordered), which is typically the case for protocols for wireless networks, there is a very simple and
natural simulation relation. Note that the state space of such protocols will consist of states comprising
of a protocol state (encoding information needed in modeling the speciﬁc protocol) and an unordered
collection of messages that have been sent but not delivered. For states s and s′ with identical protocol
states, and with the additional property that every undelivered message in s is also undelivered in s′
(s′ could have more undelivered messages), we observe that s′ simulates s. We exploit this simulation
relation in the examples.
Our second technique, called state ranking, is used to direct the state exploration more eﬀectively
towards ﬁnding assertion violations quickly. State ranking, as the name suggests, orders states based on
which state is more “likely” to have an incorrect execution starting from it. The state exploration tool
then uses a best-ﬁrst search (BeFS) algorithm that biases the search towards states with higher ranks;
more speciﬁcally, the algorithm after visiting a state, always picks successor states to visit in the order
of their ranks. To obtain a ranking of states, we exploit properties inherent to the network protocol and
the safety property being checked. However, unlike the simulation relations that we exploit, the state
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ranking that we present for the examples is not provably correct. In other words, we cannot statically
prove that states with higher ranks in our schemes have more incorrect executions. Best-ﬁrst search,
though a heuristic, does not aﬀect the soundness of our search engine (since it only changes the order of
the search) and can ﬁnd assertion violations signiﬁcantly faster, as our experiments demonstrate. One
interesting and important research question is how to determine a suitable BeFS heuristic for a speciﬁc
network protocol. We make an attempt towards answering this question by studying the performance of
several BeFS heuristics for both AODV and directed diﬀusion, and providing design guidelines based on
our results.
Finally, we evaluate the eﬃciency of our state space exploration framework by comparing its
performance to that of a state-of-the-art model checker for Java programs, namely Java PathFinder
(JPF) [35, 72]. The results of the comparison show that our framework is comparable to JPF in terms of
the time needed to ﬁnd an assertion violation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give a brief overview of network
simulation in J-Sim. In Section 3, we elaborate on the state space exploration framework that we
implemented in J-Sim. Section 4 presents the performance results. In Section 5, we discuss related work.
Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 6.
2 Network Simulation in J-Sim
As indicated by Balci et al. in [6], developing modeling and simulation applications using the
component-based technology [15] is one of the strategic directions to achieve VV&A. J-Sim [34, 70] is an
open-source network simulation and emulation environment that is developed entirely in Java on top of a
component-based software architecture, called the autonomous component architecture (ACA) [70], that
closely mimics the integrated circuit (IC) design.
The basic entities in the ACA are components, which communicate with one another via send-
ing/receiving data at their ports. When data arrives at a port of a component, the component processes
the data immediately in an independent execution context (e.g., thread in Java). Following the same
line of design principles of IC chips, how components in the ACA behave (in terms of how a component
handles and responds to data that arrives at a port) is speciﬁed at the system design time in contracts,
but component binding does not take place until the system integration time when the system is being
“composed.” A contract speciﬁes how an initiator (caller) and a reactor (callee) fulﬁll a certain function;
i.e., the causality of information exchange between components but not the components that may partic-
ipate in information exchange. Two components, acting respectively as the initiator and the reactor, are
bound at the system integration time to fulﬁll the contract. In some sense, the ACA realizes the notion of
software IC [9] where an IC corresponds to a component, pins correspond to ports, signals correspond to
data that arrives at a port of a component, and an IC speciﬁcation corresponds to a contract. Similar to
composing an electronic system (e.g., ALU) by interconnecting ICs via pins, building a simulation model
of a network protocol in J-Sim requires designing and implementing a set of components (e.g., senders,
receivers, routers, links, and protocols that run within each router/host) and interconnecting them via
ports. On top of the ACA, a generalized packet-switched internetworking framework (called INET ) has
been laid based on common features extracted from the various layers in the network protocol stack.
Both the ACA and the INET have been implemented in Java, and the resulting code, along with its
scripting framework and GUI interfaces, is called J-Sim.
J-Sim possesses several other desirable features (e.g., composability and extensibility [71]). The
fact that J-Sim is implemented in Java, along with its ACA, makes J-Sim a truly platform-independent
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simulation environment. J-Sim provides a script interface that allows its integration with diﬀerent script
languages such as Perl, Tcl, or Python. In particular, the latest release of J-Sim (version 1.3) has been
fully integrated with a Java implementation of Tcl interpreter, called Jacl, with the Tcl/Java extension.
Therefore, similar to ns-2 (ns version 2) [67], J-Sim is a dual-language simulation environment in which
classes are written in Java (for ns-2, in C++) and “wired” together using Tcl/Java2.
For all the reasons mentioned above, we believe that J-Sim is a promising candidate to be extended
with the state space exploration capability. However, we believe that our technique can be implemented
in other network simulators too. Furthermore, although we propose our technique in the context of
simulation of computer networks, the idea itself is generic enough and can be applied to other application
domains of simulation.
3 State Space Exploration Framework in J-Sim
In this section, we elaborate on the state space exploration framework that we implemented in
J-Sim.
First, we review some basic concepts of discrete-event system simulation [8] and explicit-state
model checking [16] by state space exploration. A system is a group of objects that are joined together in
some regular interaction or interdependence toward the accomplishment of some purpose (e.g., a wireless
network). A simulation model is a representation of the system for the purpose of studying the behavior
of the system with respect to certain performance evaluation criteria (e.g., network throughput). An
entity is an object of interest in the system (e.g., a wireless node). An entity is described or characterized
by its attributes (e.g., routing table, MAC address, etc.). Each attribute has a type, which may be either
simple (e.g., boolean, integer, etc.) or composite (e.g., an array of integers, an object, an array of objects,
etc.). The type of an attribute indicates the domain over which the attribute ranges. The state of the
system is a complete description of the system and includes values of all attributes of entities that are
relevant to the objective of the study (e.g., the routing table entries of all the wireless nodes and the
number/contents of the messages being sent over the wireless channel). A state s can be regarded as a
function that assigns to each attribute a value over its domain. The state space, denoted by S, is the set
of all possible system states. It should be noted that although the set of attributes is ﬁnite, S may be
inﬁnite because the domains over which the attributes range may be inﬁnite; this phenomenon is known
as the state space explosion problem. An event is an instantaneous occurrence that might change the
state of the system (e.g., message sending and message receiving); i.e., assign new values to (some of) the
attributes. An event may be either conditional or unconditional. An unconditional event is an event that
can always occur (e.g., an unpredictable crash of an active wireless node). A conditional event is an event
that can occur only if a certain enabling condition is true (e.g., a wireless node can receive a message only
if another node has sent a message to it). A safety property, also called an assertion, is a property that
must always hold true in all states (e.g., the absence of routing loops in a routing table). The meaning
of the safety property depends on the network protocol itself. For example, if the protocol is a reliable
unicast/multicast protocol, the safety property may be that the receiver(s) receive all the packets that
the sender believes to have been received. In the case of a security protocol, the safety property may be
that unauthorized users do not get access to the system. In our framework, the user speciﬁes the safety
property as a Java method whose output is true/false.
While building the state space exploration framework in J-Sim, we had two major design goals in
mind:
2The term “wire” is the term that J-Sim uses when displaying a connection between two ports.
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1. The core design and implementation of J-Sim must not be modiﬁed.
2. Any modiﬁcations to the J-Sim simulation model of the network protocol must be minimal and
must not degrade the execution time of the J-Sim simulation model if a user is only interested in
using the model for performance evaluation purposes.
We believe that these two design goals should be also kept in mind if one desires to build a state space
exploration framework in any other (network) simulator.
Towards realizing the above design goals, we implement an explicit-state stateful state space
explorer in Java as a component in the ACA of J-Sim. The state space explorer executes the J-Sim
simulation model of the network protocol directly and explores the state space on-the-ﬂy. Speciﬁcally,
the state space explorer starts from an initial state and generates successor states by executing the events
of the simulation model. This process continues until either a counterexample disproving the safety
property is found or the state space is explored up to a conﬁgurable maximum depth (MAX DEPTH).
In the former case, the state space explorer outputs a counterexample; i.e., the sequence of events that
leads to violating the safety property. In the latter case, the state space explorer reports a message stating
that “No assertion violation was found”; this does not mean that the simulation model does not violate
the assertion and further testing is not required. A violation of the safety property may exist at depths
larger than MAX DEPTH. Furthermore, the state space explorer may run out of memory (or take
an excessively long amount of time) before exploring the state space up to MAX DEPTH. Hence, the
goal of our framework is not to prove that the simulation model satisﬁes the safety properties. Instead,
the goal is to ﬁnd violations of those safety properties if any exists given a certain budget of time and
memory constraints.
3.1 The veriﬁcation model
For the purpose of performance evaluation, a simulation model contains only components of the
real system that are relevant to measuring performance. Similarly, for the purpose of veriﬁcation using
state space exploration, a veriﬁcation model contains only components of the simulation model that
are relevant to state space exploration. In other words, the simulation model is an abstraction of the
real system whereas the veriﬁcation model is an abstraction of the simulation model. In particular,
the attributes that are not relevant to checking safety properties should not be part of the veriﬁcation
model. Hence, the deﬁnition of the veriﬁcation model may change if the safety property that is to be
checked changes. This is similar to changing the simulation model if the objectives of a performance
evaluation study change. Note that the veriﬁcation model is not needed for measuring performance; it is
only needed for checking whether or not the simulation model satisﬁes the safety properties. In contrast,
the simulation model is needed for state space exploration because the events are executed inside the
simulation model. This will be explained in more detail in Section 3.2.
Figure 1 illustrates the overall framework of incorporating state space exploration into J-Sim. As
shown in Figure 1, the state space explorer interacts via ports with the protocol entities P1, P2, ... , Pn,
which are instances of the Java classes that implement the simulation model of the network protocol.
In order to explore the state space created by the simulation model, the notion of the “state” has to
be adequately deﬁned in the veriﬁcation model. To this end, the state space explorer makes use of a
class called GlobalState. The GlobalState class includes (some of) the attributes of the entities as data
members. In the veriﬁcation model, a state is an instance of the GlobalState class that assigns to each data
member (i.e., attribute) a value. The implementation of GlobalState diﬀers from one network protocol
to another; hence, it is the responsibility of the user to provide an implementation of GlobalState. In
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Figure 1: Overall framework of state space exploration in J-Sim. The protocol entities P1, P2, ... , Pn
constitute the simulation model whereas the initial state, current state and next state constitute the
veriﬁcation model.
addition, the user should also construct an initial state in order for state space exploration to get started.
As shown in Figure 1, the state space explorer interacts via ports with three instances of GlobalState,
namely initialState (the initial state), currentState (the current state being explored) and nextState
(one of the possible successors of the current state). The contract needed to deﬁne the information
exchange between the state space explorer and the three instances of GlobalState is implemented in the
ModelCheckingGlobalStateContract class, which is a subclass of Contract, a key J-Sim class that deﬁnes a
contract. As mentioned in Section 2, a contract speciﬁes the causality of information exchange between
components but not the components that may participate in the information exchange. At the system
design time, neither the initiator nor the reactor knows the identity of the other. The connection between
the initiator and the reactor (which is shown using double-arrows in Figure 1) takes place only at the
system integration time when the two components are bound to fulﬁll the contract. This ensures a loosely-
coupled component architecture. Similarly, the ModelCheckingProtocolEntityContract class implements
the contract needed to deﬁne the information exchange between the state space explorer and the protocol
entities. Making the state space explorer take control of the simulation model in order to explore the
(entire) state space, rather than just exploring one single execution path as J-Sim traditionally does, is
achieved by having the state space explorer be the initiator of the ModelCheckingProtocolEntityContract
(ModelCheckingGlobalStateContract) contract, and having a protocol entity (global state) be the reactor
respectively.
In each state in the state space, some events may or may not be enabled. Examples of events that
are common among various network protocols are: packet reception, packet loss and timeout. Enabled
events are parameterized; hence, an enabled event may generate multiple successor states depending on
the values of its parameters. For instance, a packet reception event may generate multiple successor states
because if the network contains K packets m1,m2, . . . ,mK whose destination is node n and the network
does not guarantee ordered packet delivery, K successor states can be generated depending on which
of the K packets is to be received by node n. On the other hand, a node reboot event may generate
only one successor state (namely the state of the node after reboot). In the current implementation,
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the parameters of the events are limited to integer values. For example, in the packet reception event
described above, the index i (0 ≤ i ≤ K−1) of a packet in the network is used as a parameter to determine
which packet is to be received. It is important to note that the number of possible successor states that
an enabled event can generate is state-dependent. In particular, an event may be enabled in one state
but disabled in another. It is the responsibility of the user to specify (a) the set of events that can occur,
(b) a function that dynamically determines the state-dependent number of possible successor states that
each event generates (zero if the event is disabled), and (c) how each event is handled (i.e., an event
handler function that makes a state change). Note that the event handlers are part of the simulation
model; i.e., the user has to write the event handlers anyway in order to have a working simulation model
of the network protocol in J-Sim, even if he/she does not intend to make use of the state space exploration
framework for the purpose of veriﬁcation.
3.2 The state space exploration process
Figure 2 shows the pseudo-code of the state space exploration procedure SSExploreAddCurrent(),
which is one of the main procedures in the state space explorer (Figure 1). The two major data structures
in SSExploreAddCurrent() are NonVisitedStates (which stores the states that have been encountered but
not yet explored) and AlreadyVisitedStates (which stores the states that have already been explored).
Now a traditional explicit-state model checker would avoid (re-)exploring a state s1 if the same, identical
state were previously explored, i.e., were in the data structure AlreadyVisitedStates. Figure 2, on the
other hand, presents a modiﬁed explicit-state stateful search that avoids visiting a state s1 if another
state s2 has already been visited before, which (provably) simulates it. Informally, s1 is simulated by s2
(or s2 simulates s1) if the states that can be explored from s1 are also simulated by those that can be
explored from s2; hence, there is no need to explore states from s1.3 AlreadyVisitedStates stores concrete
states, and a state s1 is said to be simulated by another state s2 if s1.isSimulatedBy(s2) returns true.
When the communication between network entities is unreliable (i.e., when message delivery is neither
guaranteed nor ordered), which is typically the case for protocols for wireless networks, there is a very
simple and natural simulation relation. Note that the state space of such protocols will consist of states
comprising of a protocol state (encoding information needed in modeling the speciﬁc protocol) and an
unordered collection of messages that have been sent but not delivered. For states s and s′ with identical
protocol states, and with the additional property that every undelivered message in s is also undelivered
in s′ (s′ could have more undelivered messages), we observe that s′ simulates s. For the examples in this
paper we exploit this simulation relation. However, in general, a user could potentially exploit speciﬁc
details of the protocol to reveal a stronger simulation relation (and hence a faster exploration of a larger
state space). Hence, we leave the implementation of isSimulatedBy() to the user.
SSExploreAddCurrent() starts with an empty AlreadyVisitedStates (Figure 2, line 2). NonVisit-
edStates initially contains the initial state only (Figure 2, line 3). As long as NonVisitedStates is not
empty (Figure 2, line 4), SSExploreAddCurrent() removes a state from NonVisitedStates and sets cur-
rentState to it (Figure 2, line 5). This operation is an example of information exchange that makes use
of the ModelCheckingGlobalStateContract contract. Speciﬁcally, the state space explorer is the initiator
and currentState is the reactor. The state space explorer sends currentState the state s that has been
3Formally, a simulation relation is a binary relation R over the set of states S (i.e., R ⊆ S × S) such that for every pair
of states s1, s2 ∈ S, if (s1, s2) ∈ R then for all events e that are enabled in s1, all parameters i of these events, and all states
s′1 ∈ S, s1 e(i)−−→ s′1 implies that there exists an event e′ that is enabled in s2, a parameter i′ of this event, and a state s′2 ∈ S
such that s2
e′(i′)−−−→ s′2, and (s′1, s′2) ∈ R. In this case, we say that s2 simulates s1 (or s1 is simulated by s2). Note that the
similarity relation is a preorder; hence, it is reﬂexive and transitive.
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removed from NonVisitedStates. currentState responds by setting its attributes to the values assigned to
them in the state s. SSExploreAddCurrent() then explores currentState only if a state simulating it has
not been visited before (Figure 2, line 6). For each state being explored (currentState), SSExploreAdd-
Current() ﬁrst adds it to AlreadyVisitedStates (Figure 2, line 7) and then determines the events that are
enabled in currentState by invoking GenerateEnabledEvents() (Figure 2, line 8). In GenerateEnabledE-
vents(), the enabling function (Figure 2, line 24) returns the number of possible successor states for each
event (zero if the event is disabled). This operation is another example of an information exchange that
makes use of the ModelCheckingGlobalStateContract contract because calculating the number of possible
successor states is done inside the veriﬁcation model. GenerateEnabledEvents() returns EnabledEvents,
which is a list of enabled events (Figure 2, line 27). Each entry in EnabledEvents stores the corresponding
event information EventInfo (Figure 2, line 26). Speciﬁcally, let each protocol entity have a unique ID p
(Figure 2, line 22), each event have a unique ID e (Figure 2, line 23), and each enabled event has a set
of integer-valued parameters i where 0 ≤ i ≤ NumberOfNextStates − 1 (Figure 2, line 25), then each
instance of EventInfo stores p, e and i.
SSExploreAddCurrent() then generates the successor states (nextState) by calling the GenerateNextState()
function (Figure 2, line 11) for each enabled event, which in turn invokes the corresponding event handler
(Figure 2, line 31). Note that an event handler is only invoked from the state space explorer but actually
executed inside the simulation model; namely the protocol entities themselves. Therefore, SSExploreAd-
dCurrent() must ﬁrst set the state of the protocol entities to the state reﬂected in currentState before the
execution of the event handler. This is achieved by the CopyFromVModelToSModel() function call (Fig-
ure 2, line 28). CopyFromVModelToSModel() is an example of an operation that makes use of both the
ModelCheckingGlobalStateContract and the ModelCheckingProtocolEntityContract contracts. Speciﬁcally,
the state space explorer uses ModelCheckingGlobalStateContract to query currentState, and currentState
responds with the state of the protocol entities reﬂected in it. Following that, the state space explorer
uses ModelCheckingProtocolEntityContract to instruct the protocol entities to set their state to the state
reﬂected in currentState. Executing an event handler (Figure 2, line 31) is an example of an operation that
makes use of the ModelCheckingProtocolEntityContract contract, where the state space explorer instructs
a protocol entity to execute an event. After the execution of the event handler, the CopyFromSModel-
ToVModel() function is called (Figure 2, line 32) to perform the reverse operation; i.e., extract the new
state information from the protocol entities and copy them to nextState. CopyFromSModelToVModel() is
another example of an operation that makes use of both the ModelCheckingProtocolEntityContract and
the ModelCheckingGlobalStateContract contracts.
SSExploreAddCurrent() then checks whether nextState violates a safety property (Figure 2, line 12).
Our state space exploration framework in J-Sim also allows the user to specify that a counterexample
has to contain at least one state that is generated due to a particular event. This requirement is checked
by calling the DoesCounterexampleContainEvent() function (Figure 2, line 13). (We have made use of
this feature in some of our experiments in Section 4.) If the user does not want to make use of this
feature, DoesCounterexampleContainEvent() always returns true. A counterexample is printed by calling
the printCounterexample() function (Figure 2, line 15), which is a recursive function that traces the
state space backwards from nextState until initialState is reached. If nextState does not violate a safety
property, nextState is added to NonVisitedStates (Figure 2, line 20) in order to be explored later if
its depth is strictly less than MAX DEPTH (Figure 2, line 17). Adding a state to NonVisitedStates
(Figure 2, line 20) or AlreadyVisitedStates (Figure 2, line 7) requires a function that creates a copy of a
state (e.g., clone()).
Depending on the order in which states are added to, and removed from, NonVisitedStates, SSEx-
ploreAddCurrent() can employ breadth-ﬁrst (BFS), depth-ﬁrst (DFS) and best-ﬁrst (BeFS) search strate-
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procedure SSExploreAddCurrent()
1. initialState.depth = 0 ;
2. AlreadyVisitedStates = { } ;
3. NonVisitedStates = { initialState } ;
4. while ( | NonVisitedStates | > 0 ) {
5. currentState = NonVisitedStates.remove() ;
6. if ( currentState is not simulated by any state in AlreadyVisitedStates ) { /* use protocol-specific properties */
7. AlreadyVisitedStates.add(currentState) ;
8. EnabledEvents = GenerateEnabledEvents(currentState) ;
9. for ( int i = 0 ; i < EnabledEvents.size() ; i++ ) {
10. EventInfo E = EnabledEvents.get(i) ;
11. nextState = GenerateNextState(currentState, E) ;
12. checkProperty = nextState.verifySafety() ;
13. if ( (checkProperty == false) AND (DoesCounterexampleContainEvent(nextState)) ) {
14. Print("Counterexample ") ;
15. printCounterexample(nextState) ;
16. exit ;
} /* end if */
17. else if ( (checkProperty == true) AND (nextState.depth < MAX_DEPTH) ) {
18. if ( search strategy is BeFS ) {
19. nextState.computeBeFSTuple() ; /* use protocol-specific properties */
}
20. NonVisitedStates.add(nextState) ;
} /* end if */
} /* end for */
} /* end if */
} /* end while */
EventInfoList GenerateEnabledEvents(GlobalState currentState)
21. EnabledEvents = { } ;
22. for ( all protocol entities p ) { /* for all protocol entities */
23. for ( all possible events e ) { /* for all events */
24. NumberOfNextStates = EnablingFunction(currentState, p, e) ;
25. for ( int i = 0 ; i < NumberOfNextStates ; i++ ) { /* for all integer-valued parameters */
26. EnabledEvents.add(new EventInfo(p, e, i)) ;
} /* end for */
} /* end for */
} /* end for */
27. return EnabledEvents ;
GlobalState GenerateNextState(GlobalState currentState, EventInfo E)
28. CopyFromVModelToSModel(currentState) ;
29. nextState = currentState ; /* Start with nextState as a copy of currentState */
30. nextState.depth += 1 ; /* Increment the depth of nextState */
31. ExecuteEvent(E) ; /* Invoke E’s event handler */
32. CopyFromSModelToVModel(nextState) ;
33. return nextState ;
Figure 2: An explicit-state stateful state space exploration procedure. This procedure adds a state being
explored (i.e., currentState) to AlreadyVisitedStates (line 7) and a state being generated (i.e., nextState)
to NonVisitedStates (line 20).
gies. Precisely, in BFS, NonVisitedStates is implemented as a ﬁrst-in ﬁrst-out (FIFO) queue; in DFS,
NonVisitedStates is implemented as a last-in ﬁrst-out (LIFO) stack; whereas in BeFS, NonVisitedStates is
implemented as a priority queue. We call these three search strategies: BFS-AC, DFS-AC and BeFS-AC
respectively4. A best-ﬁrst search strategy is implemented by state ranking. Speciﬁcally, the user writes a
function that assigns each state a tuple < b1, b2 > (Figure 2, line 19) based on protocol-speciﬁc properties.
The state space explorer then considers NonVisitedStates as a priority queue in which states are ranked
4AC stands for “Add Current”.
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procedure SSExploreAddNext()
1. initialState.depth = 0 ;
2. AlreadyVisitedStates = { initialState } ;
3. NonVisitedStates = { initialState } ;
4. while ( | NonVisitedStates | > 0 ) {
5. currentState = NonVisitedStates.remove() ;
6. EnabledEvents = GenerateEnabledEvents(currentState) ; /* See Figure 2 for GenerateEnabledEvents() */
7. for ( int i = 0 ; i < EnabledEvents.size() ; i++ ) {
8. EventInfo E = EnabledEvents.get(i) ;
9. nextState = GenerateNextState(currentState, E) ; /* See Figure 2 for GenerateNextState() */
10. checkProperty = nextState.verifySafety() ;
11. if ( (checkProperty == false) AND (DoesCounterexampleContainEvent(nextState)) ) {
12. Print("Counterexample ") ;
13. printCounterexample(nextState) ;
14. exit ;
} /* end if */
15. else if ( (checkProperty == true) AND (nextState.depth < MAX_DEPTH) ) {
16. if ( nextState is not simulated by any state in AlreadyVisitedStates ) { /* use protocol-specific properties */
17. if ( search strategy is BeFS ) {
18. nextState.computeBeFSTuple() ; /* use protocol-specific properties */
}
19. AlreadyVisitedStates.add(nextState) ;
20. NonVisitedStates.add(nextState) ;
} /* end if */
} /* end if */
} /* end for */
} /* end while */
Figure 3: An explicit-state stateful state space exploration procedure. This procedure adds a state being
generated (i.e., nextState) to both AlreadyVisitedStates (line 19) and NonVisitedStates (line 20).
in decreasing lexicographical order of this tuple; i.e., a state s1 is considered “better than” a state s2 if
s1 has a higher lexicographical order of this tuple than s2.
Note that SSExploreAddCurrent() adds a state being explored (i.e., currentState) to AlreadyVis-
itedStates (Figure 2, line 7). Another way of implementing the explicit-state stateful search is to add
a state being generated (i.e., nextState) to AlreadyVisitedStates only if nextState is not simulated by
a state that has been visited before. This stateful search, which we call SSExploreAddNext(), is shown
in Figure 3. The diﬀerence between SSExploreAddNext() and SSExploreAddCurrent() is that the former
eagerly detects and eliminates similar states while the latter lazily does so. The choice of eager versus
lazy detection of similar states may aﬀect the time and memory costs of the state space search. Since
the number of similar states in a state space is generally unknown in advance and the time and memory
budgets may diﬀer from one case study to another, we provide both types of stateful searches in our
framework. Similar to SSExploreAddCurrent(), SSExploreAddNext() can also employ BFS, DFS and BeFS
search strategies depending on the order in which states are added to, and removed from, NonVisited-
States. We call these three search strategies: BFS-AN, DFS-AN and BeFS-AN respectively5. A third
way of implementing the explicit-state stateful search is a recursive depth-ﬁrst search, which does not
make use of NonVisitedStates. We call this search strategy: DFS-R (shown in Figure 4)6.
The performance of each of the seven search strategies mentioned above depends on the order
in which enabled events are added to the list of enabled events EnabledEvents (Figure 2, line 26). SS-
ExploreAddCurrent(), SSExploreAddNext() and SSExploreRecursiveDFS() assume a ﬁxed search order; i.e.,
the order is the same each time the procedure executes. Speciﬁcally, the search order determined by the
5AN stands for “Add Next”.
6R stands for “Recursive”.
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procedure SSExploreRecursiveDFS()
1. initialState.depth = 0 ;
2. AlreadyVisitedStates = { initialState } ;
3. RecursiveDFS(initialState) ;
procedure RecursiveDFS(GlobalState s)
4. currentState = s ;
5. temp = currentState ; /* save a copy of current state */
6. EnabledEvents = GenerateEnabledEvents(currentState) ; /* See Figure 2 for GenerateEnabledEvents() */
7. for ( int i = 0 ; i < EnabledEvents.size() ; i++ ) {
8. EventInfo E = EnabledEvents.get(i) ;
9. nextState = GenerateNextState(currentState, E) ; /* See Figure 2 for GenerateNextState() */
10. checkProperty = nextState.verifySafety() ;
11. if ( (checkProperty == false) AND (DoesCounterexampleContainEvent(nextState)) ) {
12. Print("Counterexample ") ;
13. printCounterexample(nextState) ;
14. exit ;
} /* end if */
15. else if ( (checkProperty == true) AND (nextState.depth < MAX_DEPTH) ) {
16. if ( nextState is not simulated by any state in AlreadyVisitedStates ) { /* use protocol-specific properties */
17. AlreadyVisitedStates.add(nextState) ;
18. RecursiveDFS(nextState) ;
19. currentState = temp ; /* restore current state */
} /* end if */
} /* end if */
} /* end for */
Figure 4: An explicit-state stateful state space exploration procedure. SSExploreRecursiveDFS() employs
a recursive depth-ﬁrst search that does not make use of NonVisitedStates. This procedure adds a state
being generated (i.e., nextState) to AlreadyVisitedStates (line 17).
three for loops (Figure 2, lines 22-26) is: increasing order of protocol entity IDs p, increasing order of
event IDs e and increasing order of event parameters i. However, it has been shown in [23] that variations
in the search order can give rise to very large variations in state space exploration costs and assertion
violation detection eﬀectiveness. In order to allow for search order variations, we implement randomized
versions of SSExploreAddCurrent(), SSExploreAddNext() and SSExploreRecursiveDFS(). Similar to [22],
randomization is achieved by shuﬄing the set of enabled events at each state being explored using a
Fisher-Yates shuﬄing algorithm [38]. Hence, the order of enabled events in EnabledEvents is randomized
each time the function GenerateEnabledEvents() executes (Figure 2 (line 8) and Figures 3-4 (line 6)).
Randomization in the shuﬄe follows a pseudo-random sequence whose seed is passed as a parameter to
the state space exploration framework. We call the corresponding seven randomized search strategies:
BFS-ACS, DFS-ACS, BeFS-ACS, BFS-ANS, DFS-ANS, BeFS-ANS and DFS-RS.7
3.3 Implementation problems and solutions
We have encountered two major implementation problems in the course of incorporating the state
space explorer into J-Sim: one is related to how network protocol entities communicate with each other,
with the state space explorer in between; and the other is related to the ACA timers. In this section, we
describe both problems and how we solve them while keeping our two design goals met.
Without veriﬁcation using state space exploration, the protocol entities communicate with each
7ACS, ANS and RS respectively stand for “Add Current with Shuﬄe”, “Add Next with Shuﬄe” and “Recursive with
Shuﬄe”.
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Figure 5: The execution models supported by the ACA. (This ﬁgure is excerpted from [70].)
other via ports. However, when the simulation model is being veriﬁed and the state space explorer is
used as shown in Figure 1, the protocol entities need to communicate with each other via the state
space explorer. Initially, we simply connected the ports of each protocol entity to those of the state
space explorer, but then found that protocol-speciﬁc data/control messages generated by the protocol
entities during the execution of an event handler (Figure 2, line 31) may not be forwarded to the state
space explorer at the required time. This is because the state space explorer does not wait until the
protocol entities ﬁnish executing an event handler. This may cause the state space explorer to exclude
some of the new state’s information in nextState (Figure 2, line 32). We solve this problem by setting
the ports that are involved in the interaction between the state space explorer and the protocol entities
to the function-call execution model instead of the default independence execution model [70]. Figure 5
shows the two execution models supported by the ACA. In the function-call execution model, the state
space explorer (Component A in Figure 5) waits until a protocol entity (Component B in Figure 5)
ﬁnishes executing an event handler; therefore, this solution ensures that all the new state’s information
will be included in nextState. However, this solution requires modifying the J-Sim simulation model of
the network protocol; hence, it might violate our second design goal. In order to keep our design goals
met, we prefer making this modiﬁcation in a subclass of the Java class that implements the simulation
model of a network protocol entity, thus keeping the original parent Java class unmodiﬁed and ensuring
that the J-Sim simulation model execution time will not degrade if the user is only interested in using
the model for performance evaluation purposes. For a similar reason, we set the ports that are involved
in the interaction between the state space explorer and the global states to the function-call execution
model.
The second problem is related to the ACA timers, which are used to model timers (e.g., retransmis-
sion timers) in network simulation models in J-Sim. Without veriﬁcation using state space exploration,
a protocol entity that uses an ACA timer sets the timer to a pre-determined time interval. When the
timer expires, a timeout() callback function is invoked to handle the timeout event if the timer is still
active (i.e., has not already been cancelled). If the simulation model is to be veriﬁed, the state space ex-
plorer should explore all the possible transitions from a given state, and should not be limited to a single
timeout value for each timer. Instead, the state space explorer should trigger the timeout event when
that event may occur in the real world. For example, a typical retransmission timer in a reliable unicast
protocol may expire at any time as long as there is a pending data message that has been sent but not
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yet acknowledged. (We assume that the setting of the interval of a timer may diﬀer from one run of the
simulation to another (which is typically the case, especially if a pseudo-random number sequence is used
for generating the interval of a timer); otherwise, this approach may suﬀer from excessive false positives.)
A possible solution to this problem is to modify the implementation of the setTimeout() method deﬁned
in class Module, a key J-Sim class that has a timer port used to set up (and cancel) timers. However, this
solution requires modifying the core implementation of J-Sim, and hence violates our ﬁrst design goal.
In order to keep our design goals met, we choose to make this modiﬁcation in a subclass of the Java class
that implements the simulation model of a network protocol entity.
3.4 Role of the user
It should be noticed that the state space exploration process is not fully automated. We summarize
below what the user needs to do, in order to verify the simulation model of a network protocol.
1. States: Provide an implementation of GlobalState (including writing the safety property as a Java
method and a function that creates a copy of a state), and specify how to construct the initial
state. To reduce the user’s burden, we provide an implementation of a class, called SystemState,
that includes the protocol-independent information (e.g., the depth of a state, which event generated
the state). GlobalState, which should be implemented as a sub-class of SystemState, includes the
protocol-speciﬁc information.
2. Events: Specify (a) the set of events that exist in the network protocol, (b) the EnablingFunction()
that returns the state-dependent number of possible successor states that an event generates; zero
if the event is disabled, and (c) how each event is handled. (As mentioned above, the user has
to write the event handlers anyway in order to have a working simulation model of the network
protocol in J-Sim.)
3. Simulation Relation: Write the Java method isSimulatedBy() that determines, based on protocol-
speciﬁc properties, whether two states are similar. Observe that there is a general simulation relation
that can be exploited when the communication is assumed to be unreliable (Section 3.2), which is
what we use in our examples.
4. State Ranking: Write the Java method computeBeFSTuple() (Figure 2 (line 19) and Figure 3
(line 18)) that assigns each state a tuple < b1, b2 > based on protocol-speciﬁc properties such that
a state s1 is considered “better than” a state s2 if s1 has a higher lexicographical order of this tuple
than s2.
5. Interaction with the State Space Explorer: Provide implementations for the operations that
involve information exchange with the state space explorer component (e.g., CopyFromVModel-
ToSModel() and CopyFromSModelToVModel()). To facilitate programming, we made use of ports
and contracts to provide a seamless interface between components; in this case, between the state
space explorer on one side and either the protocol entities or the global states on the other side (see
Figure 1). In addition, modify the Java class that implements the simulation model of a network
protocol entity (or preferably its subclass), as explained in Section 3.3, to facilitate interaction with
the state space explorer.
It is important to note that making use of protocol-speciﬁc properties for the simulation relation
and state ranking is done in the veriﬁcation model and is hence isolated from both the state space explorer
and the simulation model. This ensures that the state space exploration framework is general enough
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and not tied to a particular network protocol or communication mechanism. In the following section, we
elaborate further on this point.
4 Evaluation and Results
We apply the J-Sim state space exploration framework to the J-Sim simulation models of two
network protocols: (a) Ad-Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector routing (Section 4.1) for wireless ad hoc
networks and (b) Directed Diﬀusion (Section 4.2) for wireless sensor networks. For each protocol, we
give an overview of its key functionality, describe the steps that we follow to verify its simulation model
including how we exploit protocol-speciﬁc properties, and present the results of this veriﬁcation. We
conduct all the experiments on a dual-processor Intel Xeon 2.8 GHz machine running Linux version
2.6.15 with 2 GB memory. We use Sun’s 1.5.0 04-b05 JVM, allocating 1.5 GB for the maximum heap
size.
4.1 Case study 1: AODV routing in multihop wireless ad hoc networks
4.1.1 Overview of AODV
The Ad-Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol [51] is a well-known and widely
used reactive routing protocol for multihop wireless ad-hoc networks. AODV is reactive in the sense that
a route to a given destination is established via a route discovery process only when it is needed by a
source node (i.e., traﬃc-driven). In this section, we describe the J-Sim simulation model of AODV, which
is based on AODV Draft (version 11) [50].
In AODV, each node n in the ad hoc network maintains a routing table. For node n, a routing
table entry (RTE) to a destination node d contains, among other ﬁelds: a next hop address nexthopn,d
(the address of the node to which n forwards data packets destined for node d), a hop count hopsn,d (the
number of hops needed to reach node d from node n) and a destination sequence number seqnon,d (a
measure of the freshness of the route information). Each RTE is associated with a lifetime. Periodically,
a route timeout event is triggered invalidating (but not deleting) all the RTEs that have not been used
(e.g., to send or forward packets to the destination) for a time interval that is greater than the lifetime.
Invalidating a RTE involves incrementing seqnon,d and setting hopsn,d to ∞.
Each node n also maintains two monotonically increasing counters: a node sequence number
seqnon and a broadcast ID bidn. When node n requires a route to a destination d, if it does not
already have a valid RTE to node d, it ﬁrst creates an invalid RTE to node d with hopsn,d set to
∞. Following that, node n broadcasts a route request (RREQ) packet containing the following ﬁelds
< n, seqnon, bidn, d, seqnon,d, hopCountq > and then increments bidn. The hopCountq ﬁeld is initialized
to 1. The pair < n, bidn > uniquely identiﬁes a RREQ packet. Each node m, receiving the RREQ packet
from node n, keeps the pair < n, bidn > in a broadcast ID cache so that it can later check if it has already
received a RREQ with the same source address and broadcast ID. If so, the incoming RREQ packet is
discarded. If not, node m either satisﬁes the RREQ by unicasting a route reply (RREP) packet back
to node n if it has a fresh enough route to node d (or it is node d itself), or rebroadcasts the RREQ
to its own neighbors after incrementing the hopCountq ﬁeld if it does not have a fresh enough route to
node d (nor is itself node d). An intermediate node m determines whether it has a fresh enough route
to node d by comparing the destination sequence number seqnom,d in its own RTE with the seqnon,d
ﬁeld in the RREQ packet. Each intermediate node also records a reverse route to the requesting node n;
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this reverse route will be used to send/forward route replies to node n. The requesting node’s sequence
number seqnon is used to maintain the freshness of this reverse route. Each entry in the broadcast ID
cache has a lifetime. Periodically, a broadcast ID timeout event is triggered causing the deletion of entries
in the cache that have expired.
A RREP packet, which is sent by an intermediate node m, contains the following ﬁelds <
hopCountp, d, seqnom,d, n >. The hopCountp ﬁeld is initialized to 1 + hopsm,d. If it is the destina-
tion d that sends the RREP packet, it ﬁrst increments seqnod and then sends a RREP packet containing
the following ﬁelds < 1, d, seqnod, n >. The unicast RREP travels back to the requesting node n via the
reverse route. Each intermediate node along the reverse route sets up a forward pointer to the node from
which the RREP came, thus establishing a forward route to the destination d, increments the hopCountp
ﬁeld and forwards the RREP packet to the next hop towards n.
If nodem oﬀers node n a new route to node d, node n compares seqnom,d (the destination sequence
number of the oﬀered route) to seqnon,d (the destination sequence number of the current route), and
accepts the route with the greater sequence number. If the sequence numbers are equal, the oﬀered route
is accepted only if it has a smaller hop count than the hop count in the RTE; i.e., hopsn,d > hopsm,d.
4.1.2 Verifying the simulation model of AODV
We next present the steps that we follow to verify the J-Sim simulation model of AODV. These
steps constitute a generic methodology for verifying the simulation model of any network protocol in
J-Sim.
Step 1. States: Deﬁnitions of the global state, the initial state, and the safety property
We deﬁne GlobalState as a tuple that has two components, namely the protocol state and the
network cloud. The protocol state of a node n includes n’s routing table, broadcast ID cache, seqnon and
bidn. The network cloud models the network as an unbounded set that contains AODV packets, and also
maintains the neighborhood information. A broadcast AODV packet whose source is node s is modeled
as a set of packets, each of which is destined for one of the neighbors (i.e., the nodes that are within the
transmission range) of node s.
In the initial global state, the network does not contain any packets and the AODV process at each
node is initialized as speciﬁed by the J-Sim simulation model of J-Sim. Speciﬁcally, the AODV process
starts with an empty routing table, empty broadcast ID cache, seqnon = 2 and bidn = 1.
An important safety property in a routing protocol such as AODV is the loop-free property. Intu-
itively, a node must not occur at two points on a path between two other nodes; therefore, at each hop
along a path from a node n to a destination d, either the destination sequence number must increase or
the hop count toward the destination must decrease. Formally, consider two nodes n and m such that m
is the next hop of n to some destination d; i.e., nexthopn,d = m. The loop-free property can be expressed
as follows [14, 45]:
((seqnon,d < seqnom,d) ∨ (seqnon,d == seqnom,d ∧ hopsn,d > hopsm,d))
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Step 2. Events
Next, we specify the set of events, when each event is enabled and the corresponding Enabling-
Function(), and how each event is handled. We classify the events into two categories: node events (i.e.,
events that are triggered inside a node) and network events (i.e., events that are triggered inside the
network). The events in each category are listed as follows:
1. Node Events
T0 Initiation of a route request by node n to a destination d = n: This event is enabled if node n
does not have a valid RTE to the destination d. When enabled, EnablingFunction(currentState,
n, T0) returns 1. The event is handled by broadcasting a RREQ.
T1 Restart of the AODV process at node n: This event may take place because of a node reboot.
This event is always enabled; i.e., EnablingFunction(currentState, n, T1) always returns 1.
The event is handled by reinitializing the state of the AODV process at node n.
T2 Broadcast ID timeout at node n: This event is enabled if there is at least one entry in the
broadcast ID cache of node n. When enabled, EnablingFunction(currentState, n, T2) returns
the number of entries in the broadcast ID cache of node n. The event is handled by deleting
an entry from the broadcast ID cache of node n.
T3 Timeout of the route to destination d at node n = d: This event is enabled if node n has a
valid RTE to node d. When enabled, EnablingFunction(currentState, n, T3) returns 1. The
event is handled by invalidating this RTE.
2. Network Events
T4 Delivering an AODV packet to node n: This event is enabled if the network contains at least
one AODV packet such that node n is the destination (or the next hop towards the destination)
of the packet and node n is one of the neighbors of the source of the packet. When enabled,
EnablingFunction(currentState, n, T4) returns the number of the AODV packets that satisfy
these conditions. The event is handled by removing one of these AODV packets from the
network and forwarding it to node n.
T5 Loss of an AODV packet destined for node n: This event is enabled if the network con-
tains at least one AODV packet that is destined for node n. When enabled, EnablingFunc-
tion(currentState, n, T5) returns the number of the AODV packets that satisfy this condition.
The event is handled by removing one of these AODV packets from the network.
Step 3. Simulation Relation: Exploiting the semantics of the communication medium
We use the general simulation relation outlined in the introduction and Section 3.2. For AODV
speciﬁcally it reduces to the following deﬁnition. A state s2 is said to simulate a state s1 if (i) s1 and
s2 have the same neighborhood information, (ii) for each AODV packet in s1, there is a corresponding
equivalent AODV packet in s2, and (iii) for each node n, s1 and s2 have equal corresponding values for
seqnon, bidn, and node n’s routing table and broadcast ID cache (each viewed as an unordered set of
entries).
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Step 4. State Ranking: Exploiting protocol-speciﬁc properties
A suitable BeFS heuristic for exploring the state space of AODV can be obtained by inspecting
the loop-free property. A node, which does not have a valid RTE to any node, does not aﬀect the truth
value of the loop-free property. Therefore, a suitable BeFS heuristic (which we call AODV-1-BeFS) is to
consider a state s1 better than a state s2 if the number of valid RTEs to any node in s1 is greater than
that in s2. In other words, < b1, b2 > is assigned to a state s such that b1 is the number of valid RTEs
to any node in s, and b2 = 0.
Another BeFS heuristic (which we call AODV-2-BeFS) is obtained by inspecting the loop-free
property, which can be rewritten as follows:
(((seqnon,d − seqnom,d) < 0) ∨ (seqnon,d == seqnom,d ∧ ((hopsm,d − hopsn,d) < 0)))
Therefore, the greater (seqnon,d − seqnom,d) and/or (hopsm,d − hopsn,d) in a state s, the more likely s is
close to an assertion violation. Hence, AODV-2-BeFS considers a state s1 better than a state s2 if the
following summation
Md =
∑
n=d((seqnon,d − seqnom,d) + (hopsm,d − hopsn,d))
in s1 is greater than that in s2, where nexthopn,d = m. The summation Md includes only the nodes n
and m that have valid RTEs to the destination d. If none of the nodes have a valid RTE to node d, Md
is set to −∞ (i.e., worst or least interesting state).
In addition to AODV-1-BeFS and AODV-2-BeFS, we also consider the following BeFS heuristics:
1. AODV-3-BeFS: This heuristic considers a state s1 better than a state s2 if the number of valid
RTEs to the destination d in s1 is greater than that in s2. However, if s1 and s2 are equally good
under this condition, s1 is considered better than s2 if the number of valid RTEs to any node in
s1 is greater than that in s2. In other words, < b1, b2 > is assigned to a state s such that b1 is the
number of valid RTEs to the destination d in s, and b2 is the number of valid RTEs to any node in
s.
2. AODV-4-BeFS: Since a valid RTE is established upon receiving a RREP packet, AODV-4-BeFS
considers a state s1 better than a state s2 if the number of RREP packets in s1 is greater than that
in s2.
3. AODV-5-BeFS: AODV-5-BeFS is the same as AODV-4-BeFS, except that if s1 and s2 are equally
good under the condition speciﬁed in AODV-4-BeFS, s1 is considered better than s2 if the number
of valid RTEs to any node in s1 is greater than that in s2.
4.1.3 Results of the veriﬁcation
Clearly, the state space created by the J-Sim simulation model of AODV is inﬁnite. Furthermore,
there is an inﬁnite number of possible initial states depending on the number of nodes and the network
topology. As an attempt towards handling the state space explosion problem, we (1) consider an initial
state of an ad hoc network consisting of N nodes: n0, n1, . . . , nN−1 arranged in a chain topology where
each node is a neighbor of both the node to its left and the node to its right (if any exists); i.e., all wireless
links are assumed to be bidirectional, and (2) reduce the number of events and states by considering only
one destination node nN−1. Therefore, all RREQ packets request a route to node nN−1 and the route
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timeout event invalidates the RTE to node nN−1 only. Furthermore, the loop-free property checks the
absence of routing loops to node nN−1 only. Although this scenario is simple, it ensures that nodes
n0, n1, . . . , nN−3 require multihop routes to reach node nN−1; i.e., AODV multihop routing is needed. In
addition, if an assertion is violated in a chain network topology, it may also be violated in an arbitrary
network topology.
By verifying the J-Sim simulation model of AODV in a chain network topology consisting of
N = 3 nodes, we have discovered an assertion violation (which we call Counterexample 1) in the AODV
simulation model caused by its failure to follow a part of the AODV speciﬁcation [50] that determines
certain actions that must be taken after a node reboot. Conceptually, if nexthop0,2 = 1 and the AODV
process at node n1 restarts due to a node reboot, the net eﬀect is that all the RTEs stored at node
n1 will be deleted. As a result, node n1 may later accept a route that was oﬀered by node n2 with a
lower sequence number than that of node n0 (i.e., seqno0,2 > seqno1,2), hence violating the loop-free
property. We also manually injected two errors (which we call Counterexamples 2 and 3 respectively): in
Counterexample 2, seqnon,d is not incremented when a RTE is invalidated and in Counterexample 3, a
RTE is deleted (instead of invalidated) when its lifetime expires. The state space exploration framework
was able to ﬁnd these two errors too.8 A routing loop may occur due to either of these two errors. This
is because in the case that nexthop0,2 = 1 and a route timeout event takes place at node n1, in either
Counterexample 2 or 3, if n1 is later oﬀered a route to node n2 by node n0, this route will be accepted
(because in Counterexample 2, hops1,2 = ∞; hence, hops1,2 > hops0,2; whereas in Counterexample
3, seqno0,2 > seqno1,2). The interested reader is referred to [60] for detailed traces (along with the
explanations) of the three counterexamples.
Table 1 gives the performance of the various randomized search strategies, for ﬁnding each of the
three counterexamples, with respect to the following two types of performance evaluation criteria: (a)
platform-independent ; namely, the number of events executed and the number of states stored in memory
(sum of the sizes of AlreadyVisitedStates and NonVisitedStates)9, and (b) platform-dependent ; namely,
the time needed to ﬁnd an assertion violation. We ran 100 experiments for each search strategy. Each
experiment has a diﬀerent seed, but the same set of 100 seeds were used for each of the seven search
strategies. For each performance evaluation criterion, we report the minimum, the maximum and the
average values. As shown in Table 1, AODV-1-BeFS-ACS (AODV-1-BeFS-ANS)10 achieves signiﬁcant
reduction with respect to the evaluation criteria when compared to other standard search strategies
such as BFS-ACS and DFS-ACS (BFS-ANS and DFS-ANS) respectively. Also, the choice of the BeFS
heuristic has an impact on the performance. As shown in Table 1, AODV-2-BeFS-ACS (AODV-2-BeFS-
ANS) performs worse than AODV-1-BeFS-ACS (AODV-1-BeFS-ANS) for the three counterexamples.
This is because AODV-2-BeFS requires that a node (and its next hop towards the destination) have
valid RTEs to the destination. This may not be true in the ﬁrst few stages (i.e., lower depths) of the
search space. Therefore, in the ﬁrst few stages of the search, the non-visited states may look equally
good and thus, AODV-2-BeFS may not be able to explore the states that are most likely to lead to
the assertion violation ﬁrst. AODV-3-BeFS tackles this problem by further diﬀerentiating equally good
states by using a two-level BeFS heuristic. Hence, as shown in Table 1, AODV-3-BeFS-ACS and AODV-5-
BeFS-ACS (AODV-3-BeFS-ANS and AODV-5-BeFS-ANS) respectively outperform AODV-2-BeFS-ACS
and AODV-4-BeFS-ACS (AODV-2-BeFS-ANS and AODV-4-BeFS-ANS) because they are able to better
8For Counterexamples 2 and 3, we require that the counterexample contain at least one state that is generated due to the
route timeout event, T3. In order to achieve that, we made use of the DoesCounterexampleContainEvent() function provided
by the state space exploration framework (Figures 2-4).
9Note that we do not report the total number of states generated because it is simply equal to the number of events
executed plus 1 (to account for the initial state).
10We explain the notation as follows: AODV-1-BeFS denotes the BeFS heuristic itself whereas AODV-1-BeFS-ACS denotes
the BeFS-ACS search strategy when making use of the AODV-1-BeFS heuristic.
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Table 1: AODV case study: Time and space requirements (sum of the sizes of AlreadyVisitedStates and
NonVisitedStates) and the number of events executed for ﬁnding the three counterexamples in a 3-node
chain ad-hoc network using several randomized search strategies.
Counterexample 1 Time (s.) Space (number of states) Events
MAX DEPTH = 10 Min Max Average Min Max Average Min Max Average
DFS-RS 0.116 14.72 3.826 20 1957 784.95 156 26215 10749.4
BFS-ACS 4.498 13.63 8.564 5995 11092 9458.18 9167 17098 14417.93
DFS-ACS 0.267 17.851 4.12 136 2084 851.12 722 27617 10958.45
AODV-1-BeFS-ACS 0.511 3.937 1.37 416 1393 709.69 1832 10965 4695.6
AODV-2-BeFS-ACS 0.214 16.734 3.431 148 2156 755.7 378 28885 8755.22
AODV-3-BeFS-ACS 0.377 4.107 1.0 278 1398 546.67 1106 11164 3170.88
AODV-4-BeFS-ACS 0.528 6.283 2.312 252 1998 937.46 1934 16313 7990.38
AODV-5-BeFS-ACS 0.535 3.966 1.718 320 1572 952.41 2045 10941 6308.36
BFS-ANS 16.007 54.494 33.365 2575 4603 3886.49 9167 17098 14417.93
DFS-ANS 0.24 16.173 3.69 100 2037 765.31 507 27753 9932.62
AODV-1-BeFS-ANS 0.514 4.477 1.548 433 1266 674.77 1571 10421 4397.15
AODV-2-BeFS-ANS 0.223 12.825 2.787 170 1839 695.18 364 22337 7343.08
AODV-3-BeFS-ANS 0.343 4.8 1.11 296 1263 538.67 954 10710 2976.71
AODV-4-BeFS-ANS 0.456 7.301 2.468 211 1736 811.82 1687 15102 7362.44
AODV-5-BeFS-ANS 0.541 5.569 2.236 233 1452 849.85 2004 10767 6139.34
Counterexample 2 Time (s.) Space (number of states) Events
MAX DEPTH = 10 Min Max Average Min Max Average Min Max Average
DFS-RS 0.096 18.213 6.44 20 2230 1069.37 109 30454 14757.33
BFS-ACS 4.399 13.096 9.04 6496 12389 9748.7 9873 18744 14907.87
DFS-ACS 0.196 19.364 5.669 97 2363 1017.75 458 31077 13351.86
AODV-1-BeFS-ACS 0.105 10.203 2.934 88 1849 716.48 118 21999 6923.73
AODV-2-BeFS-ACS 0.22 20.346 4.152 148 2391 850.84 375 30871 9916.79
AODV-3-BeFS-ACS 0.115 10.492 2.447 96 1897 558.84 129 22185 5361.24
AODV-4-BeFS-ACS 0.383 8.427 4.901 195 2097 1502.81 1302 19424 13518.75
AODV-5-BeFS-ACS 0.453 6.098 2.348 344 1935 985.5 1597 15938 7048.29
BFS-ANS 15.159 56.095 35.232 2796 5012 3991.61 9873 18744 14907.87
DFS-ANS 0.2 18.831 4.955 96 2263 920.49 483 30646 12117.64
AODV-1-BeFS-ANS 0.124 11.499 3.31 97 1808 685.9 103 21937 6730.85
AODV-2-BeFS-ANS 0.212 18.387 3.606 168 2219 799.66 369 29352 8671.63
AODV-3-BeFS-ANS 0.13 11.412 2.69 108 1842 546.27 117 22085 5199.88
AODV-4-BeFS-ANS 0.28 9.454 5.641 121 1859 1323.48 761 19492 13001.43
AODV-5-BeFS-ANS 0.479 7.7 2.85 328 1632 829.49 1562 15394 6759.06
Counterexample 3 Time (s.) Space (number of states) Events
MAX DEPTH = 10 Min Max Average Min Max Average Min Max Average
DFS-RS 0.21 12.308 3.167 62 1820 693.97 509 24509 9514.15
BFS-ACS 3.985 11.406 7.601 6074 10863 8734.19 9272 16941 13461.48
DFS-ACS 0.169 15.292 3.493 103 2147 770.35 238 28324 10058.98
AODV-1-BeFS-ACS 0.095 3.403 1.018 84 1346 512.0 99 10540 3429.25
AODV-2-BeFS-ACS 0.25 8.991 2.657 160 1512 679.49 441 19226 7844.9
AODV-3-BeFS-ACS 0.113 3.395 0.804 96 1352 413.36 128 10797 2533.99
AODV-4-BeFS-ACS 0.41 6.565 2.097 266 2085 868.41 1496 17130 7428.23
AODV-5-BeFS-ACS 0.446 1.497 0.742 303 791 490.2 1599 5518 2883.28
BFS-ANS 13.467 42.551 28.355 2587 4302 3516.31 9272 16941 13461.48
DFS-ANS 0.132 14.588 3.051 91 1912 693.38 144 25733 9199.9
AODV-1-BeFS-ANS 0.12 3.983 1.145 97 1190 468.08 99 10043 3218.25
AODV-2-BeFS-ANS 0.255 10.165 2.335 166 1608 641.02 394 20821 6984.61
AODV-3-BeFS-ANS 0.128 3.94 0.893 108 1153 383.9 112 10237 2363.52
AODV-4-BeFS-ANS 0.404 8.11 2.28 226 1857 767.34 1442 15929 6978.01
AODV-5-BeFS-ANS 0.47 1.745 0.827 237 703 434.18 1546 5361 2793.47
guide the best-ﬁrst search towards the assertion violation even at the lower depths of the search space.
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4.1.4 Comparison with the Java PathFinder (JPF) model checker
To further evaluate the state space exploration framework in J-Sim, we compare its performance
to that of Java PathFinder (JPF) [35, 72], a state-of-the-art model checker for Java programs. In this
section, we ﬁrst give an overview of JPF (version 4.1). Following that, we elaborate on how we enable JPF
to explore the state space of the J-Sim simulation model of AODV. Finally, we present the performance
results.
Overview of JPF JPF is an explicit-state model checker for Java programs. JPF takes as input a Java
program and an optional bound on the length of program execution. JPF explores all executions (up to
the given bound) that the program can have due to diﬀerent thread interleavings and nondeterministic
choices. JPF can generate as output the traces of those executions that violate a given property; e.g., the
loop-free safety property in AODV. JPF is implemented in Java as a special Java Virtual Machine (JVM)
that runs on top of the host JVM.11 The main diﬀerence between JPF and a regular JVM is that JPF
implements a backtrackable JVM; i.e., JPF can (quickly) backtrack the program execution by restoring a
state that was previously encountered during the execution. Backtracking allows exploration of diﬀerent
executions from the same state. To achieve fast backtracking, JPF uses a special representation of states
and executes program bytecodes by modifying this representation. For instance, JPF represents the
heap as follows: JPF uses integers to represent object identiﬁers and to encode all ﬁeld values, be they
primitive (int, boolean, ﬂoat, etc.) or pointers to other objects (which can hold the special value null).
(JPF determines the meaning of various integers based on the ﬁeld types kept in the class information.)
In fact, JPF represents each object as an integer array, and the entire heap as an array of integer arrays.
This special representation enables JPF to quickly store and restore states; it is crucial for making the
overall state space exploration eﬃcient.
Model Java Interface (MJI) is a JPF mechanism that allows parts of JPF execution to be delegated
from the JPF into the host JVM. MJI is analogous to the Java Native Interface (JNI) [66] that allows
parts of JVM execution to be delegated from the JVM into the native code, written in say the C language.
MJI, like JNI, splits executions at the method granularity; speciﬁcally, each method can be marked to
be executed either in JPF or in the host JVM. (JPF uses special name mangling to mark methods for
the host JVM execution.) MJI also provides API that allows the host JVM execution to manipulate the
JPF special state representation, for example to read or write ﬁeld values or to create new objects. One
advantage of MJI is that it can be used to improve the performance of JPF [20].
Enabling JPF to explore the state space of the J-Sim simulation model of AODV JPF
could not execute the code for the entire J-Sim simulator and the AODV protocol. Therefore, we had to
create a simpliﬁed version of the J-Sim simulation model of AODV. This version does not have the full
generality of the J-Sim simulator but provides the basic functionality needed to run AODV. Following
that, we wrote a test driver for the (simpliﬁed) J-Sim simulation model of AODV. The driver produces an
environment that checks which events are enabled, and initiates the execution of all sequences of enabled
events up to a conﬁgurable maximum depth (MAX DEPTH). Similar drivers were previously used in
several studies on JPF [73–75].
Figure 6 gives the pseudo-code of the driver for state space exploration in JPF. This code is exe-
cuted in JPF’s backtrackable JVM. First, the aodvNodes array, whose elements correspond to the wireless
nodes in the ad hoc network, is created and initialized (Figure 6, line 1). As long as the safety property
has not been violated and MAX DEPTH bound has not been reached, the while loop in Figure 6 (lines
4 to 15) is executed. Each iteration of the loop corresponds to a state being explored (i.e., currentState).
11In contrast to JPF, our state space exploration framework in J-Sim does not require a special JVM.
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The events that are enabled in currentState are determined by invoking the GenerateEnabledEvents()
function (Figure 6, line 5). These events are stored in the EnabledEvents list, which is returned by
GenerateEnabledEvents() (Figure 6, line 22). Following that, the JPF’s library method Verify.random(int
maxBound) is invoked (Figure 6, line 6); this method nondeterministically returns a number between zero
and maxBound. Hence, Figure 6, line 6, nondeterministically chooses an enabled event. This chosen
event is then executed (Figure 6, line 7) and the new state’s information is stored in the aodvNodes array.
Following that, the safety property is checked (Figure 6, line 8). If the safety property is violated, a
counterexample is printed (Figure 6, line 11); otherwise, if the depth of the next state is strictly less than
MAX DEPTH (Figure 6, line 13), the driver checks whether the next state is simulated by a state that
has been visited before by invoking the wasSimulated() function using the MJI API (Figure 6, line 14).
If wasSimulated() returns true, the JPF’s library method Verify.ignoreIf() instructs JPF to backtrack the
execution; hence, another enabled event will be nondeterministically chosen in Figure 6, line 6. If not,
the state space exploration proceeds in the search order determined by the search strategy: breadth-ﬁrst
(BFS), depth-ﬁrst (DFS) or best-ﬁrst (BeFS). It should be noted that the driver (Figure 6) does not
contain code for storing and restoring states because this is done by JPF. (In our state space exploration
framework, storing and restoring states is implemented by adding states to, and removing them from,
NonVisitedStates.)
In summary, the tasks that are executed inside the JPF’s backtrackable JVM are: the overall state
space exploration process, checking which events are enabled in each state being explored, executing the
enabled events and checking the safety property. On the other hand, the tasks that are executed inside
the host JVM are: implementing a stateful search (using the simulation relation that determines state
similarity), and implementing a best-ﬁrst search (using state ranking by assigning a tuple < b1, b2 >
to each state being generated). The reason why these tasks have to be done inside the host JVM
instead of the JPF’s backtrackable JVM is that these tasks depend on the protocol-speciﬁc properties
(e.g., the routing table entries in AODV). Due to the JPF special state representation, these protocol-
speciﬁc properties are represented using (arrays of) integers; hence, not directly accessible. Therefore,
we make use of the MJI API to manipulate the JPF special state representation, extract the protocol-
speciﬁc properties and construct an instance of the GlobalState class inside the regular host JVM. This
is achieved by the constructGlobalState() function call (Figure 7, line 1). Following that, we can check
state similarity (Figure 7, line 2) and enable state ranking by assigning a tuple < b1, b2 > to nextState
(Figure 7, line 4) in the same way as we did with instances of the GlobalState class in J-Sim.
Results of the comparison between J-Sim and JPF Table 2 gives the (i) time, (ii) space (size of
AlreadyVisitedStates), and (iii) number of events executed for ﬁnding the three counterexamples using
both J-Sim and JPF with several search strategies. Since we used the same deﬁnition of the simulation
relation that determines state similarity and the same implementations of BeFS heuristics for state
ranking in both tools, the number of events executed and the number of states in AlreadyVisitedStates
are exactly the same for both J-Sim and JPF. (We have also veriﬁed that this is the case for lower values
of MAX DEPTH where the assertion violations do not occur. In fact, we have also veriﬁed that the
sequence in which states are visited is exactly the same for both J-Sim and JPF.) Therefore, both J-Sim
and JPF are having the same amount of “workload”. Table 2 shows the time needed by both tools to
ﬁnish that workload. The last column of Table 2 shows the ratio between the time needed by JPF and
that needed by J-Sim to ﬁnd the assertion violation. In the case that a small number of events is executed
(e.g., the cases of AODV-2-BeFS-AN and AODV-3-BeFS-AN), JPF is much slower than J-Sim. In the
case that a moderate number of events is executed (e.g., the cases of AODV-4-BeFS-AN and AODV-5-
BeFS-AN in Counterexamples 1 and 3), JPF is slower than J-Sim. In the case that a large number of
events is executed (e.g., the cases of DFS-R and BFS-AN), the time needed to ﬁnd an assertion violation
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procedure JPFDriver()
1. initialize(aodvNodes) ;
2. depth = 0 ;
3. checkProperty = true ;
4. while ( (checkProperty == true) AND (depth < MAX_DEPTH) ) {
5. EnabledEvents = GenerateEnabledEvents() ;
6. eventID = Verify.random(EnabledEvents.size() - 1) ;
7. ExecuteEvent(EnabledEvents.get(eventID)) ;
8. checkProperty = verifySafety() ;
9. if ( (checkProperty == false) AND (DoesCounterexampleContainEvent(nextState)) ) {
10. Print("Counterexample ") ;
11. printCounterexample() ;
12. exit ;
} /* end if */
13. else if ( (checkProperty == true) AND ((depth + 1) < MAX_DEPTH) ) {
14. Verify.ignoreIf(wasSimulated(aodvNodes)) ; /* wasSimulated() is invoked using MJI API */
} /* end if */
15. depth = depth + 1 ;
} /* end while */
EventInfoList GenerateEnabledEvents()
16. EnabledEvents = { } ;
17. for ( all protocol entities p ) { /* for all protocol entities */
18. for ( all possible events e ) { /* for all events */
19. NumberOfNextStates = EnablingFunction(p, e) ;
20. for ( int i = 0 ; i < NumberOfNextStates ; i++ ) { /* for all integer-valued parameters */
21. EnabledEvents.add(new EventInfo(p, e, i)) ;
} /* end for */
} /* end for */
} /* end for */
22. return EnabledEvents ;
Figure 6: Driver for state space exploration in JPF. This code is executed in JPF’s backtrackable JVM.
native boolean wasSimulated(MJIEnv env, int classRef, int objRef)
/* wasSimulated() is ‘‘native’’; hence, it is executed in the regular host JVM. */
1. nextState = constructGlobalState(env, objRef) ;
2. if ( nextState is not simulated by any state in AlreadyVisitedStates ) { /* use protocol-specific properties */
3. if ( search strategy is BeFS ) {
4. nextState.computeBeFSTuple() ; /* use protocol-specific properties */
}
5. AlreadyVisitedStates.add(nextState) ;
6. return false ;
}
7. else
8. return true ;
}
Figure 7: Code executed in the regular host JVM.
by JPF is close to that of our state space exploration framework in J-Sim, with JPF outperforming J-Sim
in only one case of BFS-AN.
In order to further compare the performance of the state space exploration framework in J-Sim
with that in JPF in the cases that a large number of events is executed, we implemented the shuﬄing
algorithm, which was mentioned in Section 3.2, in JPF and ran 100 experiments for each of the BFS-ANS
and DFS-RS search strategies and the three counterexamples. Each experiment has a diﬀerent seed, but
the same set of 100 seeds were used for each of J-Sim and JPF. In all experiments, we have veriﬁed that
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Table 2: AODV case study: Time and space requirements (size of AlreadyVisitedStates) and the number
of events executed for ﬁnding the three counterexamples in a 3-node chain ad-hoc network using both
J-Sim and JPF with several search strategies.
Counterexample 1 JPF J-Sim JPF/J-Sim
MAX DEPTH = 10 Space (number of states) Events Time (s.) Time (s.) Time Ratio
BFS-AN 2828 16604 50.955 49.31 1.033
DFS-R 1086 15939 29.007 7.34 3.952
AODV-1-BeFS-AN 411 3515 7.603 1.128 6.74
AODV-2-BeFS-AN 311 1236 4.422 0.535 8.265
AODV-3-BeFS-AN 206 1004 3.652 0.433 8.434
AODV-4-BeFS-AN 582 6376 12.921 2.048 6.309
AODV-5-BeFS-AN 523 5532 11.265 1.839 6.126
Counterexample 2 JPF J-Sim JPF/J-Sim
MAX DEPTH = 10 Space (number of states) Events Time (s.) Time (s.) Time Ratio
BFS-AN 2886 16928 51.729 51.915 0.996
DFS-R 1128 16533 29.896 8.215 3.639
AODV-1-BeFS-AN 407 3462 7.61 1.125 6.764
AODV-2-BeFS-AN 306 1192 4.329 0.54 8.017
AODV-3-BeFS-AN 206 965 3.598 0.421 8.546
AODV-4-BeFS-AN 1563 18536 34.023 10.017 3.397
AODV-5-BeFS-AN 1330 15314 28.448 8.063 3.528
Counterexample 3 JPF J-Sim JPF/J-Sim
MAX DEPTH = 10 Space (number of states) Events Time (s.) Time (s.) Time Ratio
BFS-AN 2644 16002 56.858 44.213 1.286
DFS-R 1052 15497 33.836 7.011 4.826
AODV-1-BeFS-AN 406 3453 9.227 1.075 8.583
AODV-2-BeFS-AN 303 1182 5.246 0.508 10.327
AODV-3-BeFS-AN 205 956 4.343 0.408 10.645
AODV-4-BeFS-AN 574 6286 15.693 2.001 7.843
AODV-5-BeFS-AN 515 5300 13.49 1.741 7.748
the sequence in which states are visited is exactly the same for both J-Sim and JPF; i.e., the common
random numbers are synchronized. Figure 8 shows the diﬀerence between the average JPF time and the
average J-Sim time for ﬁnding the three counterexamples in a 3-node chain ad-hoc network topology. As
shown in Figure 8, the time needed to ﬁnd an assertion violation by our state space exploration framework
in J-Sim is several seconds less than that of JPF.
Next, we compare the scalability of our state space exploration framework in J-Sim with that
of JPF. Speciﬁcally, we study the eﬀect of increasing the number of nodes, N , in the network on the
performance of both tools with respect to the time needed to ﬁnd an assertion violation. Table 3 gives
the (i) time, (ii) space (size of AlreadyVisitedStates), and (iii) number of events executed for ﬁnding
Counterexample 3 in a N-node chain ad-hoc network using both J-Sim and JPF with the AODV-1-BeFS-
AN search strategy. As shown in Table 3, our framework is able to ﬁnd a counterexample in larger
network topologies within reasonable time and space requirements. Furthermore, in the case that a large
number of events is executed (e.g., the cases of N = 11 and N = 12), the time needed to ﬁnd an assertion
violation by our state space exploration framework in J-Sim is comparable to that of JPF.
The overall conclusion drawn from Tables 2-3 and Figure 8 is that our state space exploration
framework in J-Sim is comparable to JPF in terms of the time needed to ﬁnd an assertion violation. This
justiﬁes the need for building a framework in J-Sim for the veriﬁcation of network simulation models
by state space exploration instead of using a general-purpose model checking tool since we believe that
wireless network protocol designers and simulation modelers will feel more comfortable using J-Sim as
a single integrated environment for both building a simulation model and verifying its correctness than
using J-Sim for building a simulation model and using another tool (JPF) for verifying its correctness.
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Figure 8: AODV case study: The diﬀerence between the average JPF time and the average J-Sim time
for ﬁnding the three counterexamples in a 3-node chain ad-hoc network topology using the BFS-ANS and
DFS-RS search strategies and MAX DEPTH = 10. We report the diﬀerence in means obtained from
the 100 experiments and the 99% conﬁdence interval.
4.2 Case study 2: Directed diﬀusion in wireless sensor networks (WSNs)
4.2.1 Overview of directed diﬀusion
A major objective of a wireless sensor network (WSN) is to monitor and sense events of interests
(e.g., changes in the acoustic sound, seismic, or temperature) in a speciﬁc environment. Events of interest
are generated by target nodes. For instance, a moving tank in a battleﬁeld may generate ground vibrations
that can be detected by seismic sensors. Upon detecting an event of interest, sensor nodes send reports
to sink (user) nodes either periodically or on demand. From the perspective of network simulation, a
WSN typically consists of these three types of nodes: sensor nodes (that sense and detect the events of
interest), target nodes (that generate events of interest), and sink nodes (that utilize and consume the
sensor information). The implementation details of the simulation and emulation frameworks for WSNs
in J-Sim can be found in [56–58]. In this section, we describe the J-Sim simulation model of directed
diﬀusion.
Directed diﬀusion [33] is a data-centric information dissemination paradigm for WSNs. Concep-
tually, data in WSNs is the collected (or processed) information of a physical phenomenon. In directed
diﬀusion, a sink node periodically broadcasts an INTEREST packet, containing the description of a
sensing task that it is interested in (e.g., detecting a chemical explosion in a speciﬁc area). INTEREST
packets are diﬀused throughout the network; e.g., via ﬂooding. After receiving an INTEREST packet, a
node may decide to re-send the INTEREST packet to its neighbors, or suppress a received INTEREST
if it has recently resent a matching INTEREST. INTEREST packets are used to set up exploratory gra-
dients. A gradient is the direction state created in each node that receives an INTEREST, where the
gradient direction is set toward the neighboring node from which the INTEREST is received. It should
be noted that this mechanism results in neighboring nodes establishing a gradient toward each other.
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Table 3: AODV case study: Time and space requirements (size of AlreadyVisitedStates) and the number
of events executed for ﬁnding Counterexample 3 in a N-node chain ad-hoc network using both J-Sim and
JPF with the AODV-1-BeFS-AN search strategy.
JPF J-Sim JPF/J-Sim
N MAX DEPTH Space (number of states) Events Time (s.) Time (s.) Time Ratio
3 15 73 155 2.665 0.174 15.316
4 20 408 2138 9.728 1.002 9.709
5 25 1884 23834 98.206 26.248 3.741
6 30 517 2939 19.472 1.802 10.806
7 35 596 1862 22.629 1.954 11.581
8 40 828 2851 40.693 3.778 10.771
9 45 3344 87052 554.823 180.637 3.071
10 50 3761 108106 749.47 232.425 3.225
11 55 4000 121728 923.757 248.968 3.71
12 60 4069 127635 1201.156 274.348 4.378
This is because when a node receives an INTEREST from its neighbor, it has no way of knowing whether
that INTEREST was in response to one it sent out earlier or is an identical INTEREST from another
sink on the other side of that neighbor.
Each node maintains an interest cache. Each interest entry in this cache corresponds to a distinct
interest and stores information about the gradients that a node has (up to one gradient per neighbor)
for that interest. Each gradient in an interest entry has a lifetime that is determined by the sink node.
When a gradient expires, it is removed from its interest entry. When all gradients in an interest entry
have been removed, the interest entry itself is removed from the interest cache.
When an INTEREST packet arrives at a sensor node that can sense data which matches the
interest, this sensor node becomes a source node, prepares DATA packets (each of which describes the
sensed data), and sends them to neighbors for whom it has a gradient once every exploratory interval.
Each node also maintains a data cache that keeps track of recently seen DATA packets. When a node
receives a DATA packet, if the DATA packet has a matching data cache entry, it is discarded; otherwise,
the node adds the received DATA packet to the data cache and forwards it to each neighbor for whom the
node has a gradient. As a result, DATA packets are forwarded toward the sink node(s) along (possibly)
multiple gradient paths.
Upon receipt of a DATA packet, a sink node reinforces its preferred neighbor based on a data-
driven local rule. For instance, the sink node may reinforce any neighbor from which it received previously
unseen data (i.e., the neighbor from which it ﬁrst received the latest data matching the interest). The
data cache is used to determine that preferred neighbor. In order to reinforce a neighbor, the sink node
sends a positive reinforcement packet to that neighbor to inform it of sending data at a smaller interval
(i.e., higher rate) than the exploratory interval, thereby establishing a reinforced gradient (also called data
gradient) towards the sink node. The reinforced neighbor will in turn reinforce its preferred neighbor.
This process repeats all the way back to the data source, resulting in a reinforced path (i.e., a chain of
reinforced gradients) between the source and the sink nodes. It should be noticed that this mechanism
can result in more than one path being reinforced, thereby consuming more energy. Furthermore, one
reinforced path may turn out to be consistently “better” than another path, which then needs to be
negatively reinforced. Speciﬁcally, a negative reinforcement packet is used to inform a neighbor to send
data at the lower rate determined by the exploratory interval. Similar to positive reinforcements, a data-
driven local rule is used to decide whether to negatively reinforce a neighbor or not. One plausible rule
is to negatively reinforce a neighbor from whom no new events have been received within a window of W
events (i.e., the neighbor that consistently sends previously seen events).
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4.2.2 Verifying the simulation model of directed diﬀusion
We follow the same steps in Section 4.1.2 to verify the simulation model of directed diﬀusion.
Step 1. States: Deﬁnitions of the global state, the initial state, and the safety property
We use the same deﬁnitions of GlobalState and network cloud that were introduced in Section 4.1.2.
On the other hand, since the protocol state is protocol-speciﬁc, the protocol state in directed diﬀusion
includes each node’s interest cache and data cache. In the initial global state, the network does not
contain any packets and the directed diﬀusion process at each node starts with an empty interest cache
and an empty data cache.
The safety property that we check is the loop-free property of the reinforced path. Consider two
nodes n and m where RPath(n,m) is true if and only if there is a reinforced path from n to m. The
loop-free property can be expressed as follows:
¬ ( RPath(n,m) ∧ RPath(m,n) ).
Step 2. Events
Next, we specify the set of events, when each event is enabled and the corresponding Enabling-
Function(), and how each event is handled. We classify the events into two categories: node events and
network events. The events in each category are listed as follows:
1. Node Events
T0 Initiation of a sensing task by node n: This event is enabled if node n is a sink node. When en-
abled, EnablingFunction(currentState, n, T0) returns 1. The event is handled by broadcasting
an INTEREST packet.
T1 Restart of the directed diﬀusion process at node n: This event may take place because of a
node reboot. This event is always enabled; i.e., EnablingFunction(currentState, n, T1) always
returns 1. The event is handled by reinitializing the state of the directed diﬀusion process at
node n.
T2 Gradient timeout at node n: This event is enabled if the interest cache of node n contains
at least one interest entry that has at least one gradient. When enabled, EnablingFunc-
tion(currentState, n, T2) returns the total number of gradients in the interest cache of node
n. The event is handled by removing one of the gradients in the interest cache of node n. If
all gradients in an interest entry have been removed, the interest entry itself is removed from
the interest cache.
T3 Data cache timeout12 at node n: This event is enabled if there is at least one entry in the data
cache of node n. When enabled, EnablingFunction(currentState, n, T3) returns the number of
entries in the data cache of node n. The event is handled by deleting an entry from the data
cache of node n.
12For practical reasons, previously received DATA packets can not be kept in the data cache for an indeﬁnitely long time;
otherwise, the size of the data cache can increase arbitrarily. In the J-Sim simulation model of directed diﬀusion, each DATA
packet in the data cache is associated with a lifetime. Periodically, a data cache timeout event is triggered causing the
deletion of entries in the cache that have expired.
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2. Network Events
T4 Delivering a packet to node n: This event is enabled if the network contains at least one packet
that is destined for node n such that node n is one of the neighbors of the source of the packet.
When enabled, EnablingFunction(currentState, n, T4) returns the number of the packets that
satisfy this condition. The event is handled by removing one of these packets from the network
and forwarding it to node n.
T5 Loss of a packet destined for node n: This event is enabled if the network contains at least
one packet that is destined for node n. When enabled, EnablingFunction(currentState, n,
T5) returns the number of the packets that satisfy this condition. The event is handled by
removing one of these packets from the network.
Step 3. Simulation Relation: Exploiting the semantics of the communication medium
Again, we use the general simulation relation outlined in the introduction and Section 3.2. For
directed diﬀusion this reduces to the following deﬁnition. A state s2 is said to simulate a state s1 if (i)
s1 and s2 have the same neighborhood information, (ii) for each packet in s1, there is a corresponding
equivalent packet in s2, and (iii) for each node n, s1 and s2 have correspondingly equal node n’s interest
cache and data cache (each viewed as an unordered set of entries).
Step 4. State Ranking: Exploiting protocol-speciﬁc properties
In the course of verifying the J-Sim simulation model of AODV, AODV-1-BeFS and AODV-3-
BeFS provided comparatively better performance results. Hence we use these two BeFS heuristics to
devise two corresponding BeFS heuristics for directed diﬀusion. In particular, the loop-free property for
AODV involves only valid RTEs to a destination d, and by analogy, the loop-free property for directed
diﬀusion involves only reinforced gradients. Similarly, data packets are forwarded in AODV based on the
next hop information stored in the valid RTEs, and by analogy, data packets are forwarded in directed
diﬀusion based on the gradients established at the nodes. Therefore, two potentially good BeFS heuristics
for exploring the state space of directed diﬀusion are:
1. DD-1-BeFS: This heuristic considers a state s1 better than a state s2 if the total number of both
exploratory and reinforced gradients in s1 is greater than that in s2. In other words, < b1, b2 > is
assigned to a state s such that b1 is the total number of both exploratory and reinforced gradients
in s, and b2 = 0.
2. DD-2-BeFS: This heuristic considers a state s1 better than a state s2 if the number of reinforced
gradients in s1 is greater than that in s2. However, if s1 and s2 are equally good under this condition,
s1 is considered better than s2 if the total number of both exploratory and reinforced gradients in
s1 is greater than that in s2. In other words, < b1, b2 > is assigned to a state s such that b1 is the
number of reinforced gradients in s, and b2 is the total number of both exploratory and reinforced
gradients in s.
Along a similar line of arguments, we also devise the following BeFS heuristics:
1. DD-3-BeFS: Since a reinforced gradient is established upon receiving a positive reinforcement
packet, DD-3-BeFS considers a state s1 better than a state s2 if the number of positive reinforcement
packets in s1 is greater than that in s2.
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2. DD-4-BeFS: DD-4-BeFS is the same as DD-3-BeFS, except that if s1 and s2 are equally good under
the condition speciﬁed in DD-3-BeFS, s1 is considered better than s2 if the total number of both
exploratory and reinforced gradients in s1 is greater than that in s2.
3. DD-5-BeFS: This heuristic considers a state s1 better than a state s2 if the total number of data
cache entries at all nodes in s1 is greater than that in s2.
4. DD-6-BeFS: DD-6-BeFS is the same as DD-5-BeFS, except that if s1 and s2 are equally good under
the condition speciﬁed in DD-5-BeFS, s1 is considered better than s2 if the total number of both
exploratory and reinforced gradients in s1 is greater than that in s2.
4.2.3 Results of the veriﬁcation
We consider an initial state that consists of a chain topology of N nodes: n0 (the only sink
node), n1, . . . , nN−1 (the only source node). A loop in the reinforced path may take place because the
interest and gradient setup mechanisms themselves do not guarantee loop-free reinforced paths between
the source and the sink nodes. In order to prevent loops from taking place, the data cache is used to
suppress previously seen DATA packets. However, we discover that, in the case of (a) the deletion of a
DATA packet from the data cache and/or (b) a node reboot (which eﬀectively deletes all the entries in the
data and interest caches), a loop may be created. The loop that is created in the ﬁrst case is referred to
as Counterexample 1 while the loop that is created in the second case is referred to as Counterexample 2.
For instance, consider a chain topology consisting of N = 4 nodes. If n1 accepts a DATA packet sent by
n2, n2 becomes n1’s preferred neighbor. Now, if n2 deletes the DATA packet from its data cache due to
a data cache timeout (Counterexample 1) or a node reboot (Counterexample 2), it may later accept the
DATA packet sent by n1 (because it will be previously unseen data) causing n1 to become n2’s preferred
neighbor. (Recall that neighboring nodes establish gradients toward each other.) Therefore, n1 and n2
may positively reinforce each other causing a loop in the reinforced path. In fact, positive reinforcement
packets may not eventually reach the source node causing a disruption in the reinforced path (i.e., the
reinforced path may include a loop that does not include the source node).13 The interested reader is
referred to [61] for detailed traces (along with the explanations) of the two counterexamples. It has to
be mentioned that although the reinforced path may have a loop, this loop will not continue to exist
forever. It will be removed later either by the negative reinforcement mechanism or by the gradient
timeout mechanism. Furthermore, forwarding a DATA packet over the loop will stop once all nodes on
the loop have received the DATA packet.
Table 4 gives the (i) time, (ii) space (sum of the sizes of AlreadyVisitedStates and NonVisited-
States), and (iii) number of events executed for ﬁnding the two counterexamples using several search
strategies. As shown in Table 4, DD-1-BeFS-AN provides orders of magnitude reduction with respect
to the evaluation criteria when compared to other standard search strategies such as BFS-AN and DFS-
R. Furthermore, DD-4-BeFS-AN outperforms DD-3-BeFS-AN, and DD-6-BeFS-AN outperforms DD-
5-BeFS-AN. This is because both DD-4-BeFS and DD-6-BeFS are two-level BeFS heuristics that use
DD-1-BeFS if the non-visited states are equally good and are thus able to better guide the best-ﬁrst
search strategy, in the lower depths of the search space, than DD-3-BeFS and DD-5-BeFS respectively.
13For Counterexample 2, we require that the counterexample contain at least one state that is generated due to a node
reboot event, T1. Furthermore, in order to show that a loop in the reinforced path may still take place even if the data
cache timeout event, T3, does not happen (i.e., the data cache size is inﬁnite), we disabled T3; i.e., we made EnablingFunc-
tion(currentState, n, T3) always return zero.
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Table 4: Directed diﬀusion case study: Time and space requirements (sum of the sizes of AlreadyVisited-
States and NonVisitedStates) and the number of events executed for ﬁnding the two counterexamples in
a 4-node chain WSN using diﬀerent search strategies. N/A indicates that the state space explorer is not
able to ﬁnd a counterexample in two hours.
Counterexample 1, MAX DEPTH = 15
Time (s.) Space (number of states) Events
BFS-AN 915.115 16717 115698
DFS-R 384.863 8306 173823
DD-1-BeFS-AN 0.772 512 1019
DD-2-BeFS-AN 0.794 500 1256
DD-3-BeFS-AN 153.405 5638 113342
DD-4-BeFS-AN 0.396 284 474
DD-5-BeFS-AN 643.72 14284 175807
DD-6-BeFS-AN 402.375 12985 95036
Counterexample 2, MAX DEPTH = 20
Time (s.) Space (number of states) Events
BFS-AN 6975.04 44328 425181
DFS-R 380.97 8027 179112
DD-1-BeFS-AN 344.434 18063 92820
DD-2-BeFS-AN 516.592 20435 132382
DD-3-BeFS-AN 5644.553 35175 835463
DD-4-BeFS-AN 51.816 5464 38304
DD-5-BeFS-AN N/A N/A N/A
DD-6-BeFS-AN 5573.121 55164 505582
Table 5 gives the time and space requirements and the number of events executed for ﬁnding
Counterexample 1 in a chain topology consisting ofN nodes using DD-4-BeFS-AC. Again our framework is
able to ﬁnd a counterexample in larger network topologies within reasonable time and space requirements.
4.3 Lessons learned
In this section, we summarize the lessons learned in the two case studies. First, we show that the
state space exploration framework is able to verify the simulation models of two fairly complex network
protocols such as AODV and directed diﬀusion. This demonstrates that the framework is general enough
and not tied to a particular network protocol. To verify the simulation model of another network protocol,
one needs to follow the steps as outlined in Sections 4.1-4.2.
Second, we demonstrate that the use of BeFS heuristics reduces the time and space requirements
by several orders of magnitude when compared to classic breadth-ﬁrst and depth-ﬁrst search strategies.
Based on the results obtained for the BeFS heuristics that we devised, we recommend deriving the BeFS
heuristic from properties inherent to the network protocol and the safety property being checked. This
is justiﬁed by the observation that AODV-1-BeFS and DD-1-BeFS provide better performance results in
terms of time and space requirements and number of events executed for ﬁnding a violation of a safety
property as shown in Table 1 and Table 4 respectively. Furthermore, using a two-level BeFS heuristic,
in which a BeFS heuristic such as AODV-1-BeFS or DD-1-BeFS is used if the non-visited states are
equally good, also improved the performance. This is justiﬁed by the observation that AODV-5-BeFS
outperforms AODV-4-BeFS (Table 1), DD-4-BeFS outperforms DD-3-BeFS, and DD-6-BeFS outperforms
DD-5-BeFS (Table 4).
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Table 5: Directed diﬀusion case study: Time and space requirements (sum of the sizes of AlreadyVis-
itedStates and NonVisitedStates) and the number of events executed for ﬁnding Counterexample 1 in a
N-node chain WSN using DD-4-BeFS-AC.
N MAX DEPTH Time (s.) Space (number of states) Events
4 15 0.296 247 474
5 20 19.683 2289 27826
6 25 51.19 3604 51341
7 30 48.137 4503 51649
8 35 147.889 8506 110540
9 40 291.87 13839 172912
10 45 931.59 24105 347204
11 50 1667.782 33422 495318
12 55 4543.767 51666 867921
5 Related Work
The amount of research on veriﬁcation and validation (V&V) of simulation models is large and
considerably focuses on statistical techniques that compare the output of the simulation model with the
output of the real system (e.g., the method of simultaneous conﬁdence intervals [7]). In this section, we
highlight some previous work that is closely related to ours. For further details on veriﬁcation, validation,
and testing of simulation models, the interested reader is referred to [5].
Model-checking Network Protocol Implementation Code Our work on verifying the computer-
ized simulation model of a network protocol using state space exploration and protocol-speciﬁc properties
is inspired by the previous work on model-checking network protocol implementation code directly for
C and C++ (e.g., CMC [44, 45] and VeriSoft [28]). Although CMC has been applied to model-check
Linux implementations of networking code (e.g., AODV and TCP), the major distinction between our
approach and CMC is that CMC uses protocol-independent properties in guiding the best-ﬁrst search.
It does so by attempting to focus on states that are the most diﬀerent from previously explored states.
In contrast, our approach uses protocol-dependent properties, inherent to the network protocol and the
safety property being checked, to guide a best-ﬁrst search strategy towards ﬁnding an assertion violation
faster.
Likewise, VeriSoft uses protocol-independent techniques, namely partial-order reduction (POR)
using the persistent and sleep sets [28]. POR is an approach towards alleviating the state space explosion
problem, and aims at reducing the size of the state space by exploiting the independence relation between
events. Independent events can neither disable nor enable each other, and enabled independent events
commute; i.e., result in the same state when executed in diﬀerent orders. Traditional algorithms for
computing persistent sets exploit information that is typically inferred by a static analysis of the code.
However, as pointed out in [27], these algorithms suﬀer from a fundamental limitation, namely determin-
ing this information with acceptable precision, in the context of concurrent software systems executing
arbitrary code, is often diﬃcult or impossible. In an attempt towards avoiding this inherent imprecision
of static analysis, dynamic POR [27] was proposed. The algorithm, which is called dynamic partial-order
reduction, dynamically tracks interactions between processes and then exploits this information to iden-
tify backtracking points where alternative paths in the state space need to be explored. In principle,
dynamic POR can be combined with both shuﬄing and best-ﬁrst search strategies. Speciﬁcally, POR
ﬁrst determines which events to explore, a shuﬄing procedure then shuﬄes the sequence in which those
events are executed, and a best-ﬁrst search strategy ﬁnally determines which of the successor states being
generated can potentially lead to an assertion violation faster.
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The idea of using best-ﬁrst search heuristics to expedite the model checking process has been
explored in previous work (e.g., [24, 29, 30, 65, 76]). However, what distinguishes our work from the
previous work is that we study the use of protocol-speciﬁc heuristics in verifying the simulation model.
Moreover, we focus on a speciﬁc domain, namely routing and data dissemination protocols for wireless
ad hoc and sensor networks, and attempt to discover eﬀective protocol-speciﬁc heuristics that enable
a best-ﬁrst search strategy to ﬁnd assertion violations in less time and space requirements than classic
breadth-ﬁrst and depth-ﬁrst search strategies.
Conventional Explicit-State and Symbolic Model Checking In contrast to model-checking the
implementation code (or the computerized simulation model) of a network protocol directly, conventional
explicit-state and symbolic model checkers (e.g., SPIN [32], SMV [43], SAL [68], Murphi [21]) require that
the system be ﬁrst speciﬁed using a high-level modeling language. For example, [52] presents the simula-
tion and veriﬁcation of the priority-ceiling protocol (PCP) using SAL. In general, the process of describing
the system in a high-level modeling language is time-consuming, painstaking, and error-prone [45]. To
deal with this problem, there has been some work (e.g., [19, 26, 31, 49]) on translating programming lan-
guages (e.g., Java) to the input modeling languages of several conventional model checkers. However,
this may not be always feasible because some features of C or Java (e.g., memory allocation and bit op-
erations) do not have corresponding ones in the destination modeling language. Therefore, our approach
of directly verifying the simulation model, which has to be written by the user anyway for the purpose
of performance evaluation, reduces the user’s eﬀort and avoids the limitations of the input languages of
conventional model checkers.
Formal Analysis of Network Simulation As far as formal analysis of network simulation is con-
cerned, Verisim [13] was developed based on a collection of pre-existing tools, namely ns-2 [67] and the
MaC monitoring and checking framework [37]. Verisim replaces the monitor component of MaC by ns-2
and uses the checker component of MaC to verify user-deﬁned properties on traces produced by ns-2. It
should be noted, however, that not all assertion violations may manifest themselves in a trace because
ns-2 does not explore all possible execution paths during a simulation run. Towards giving formal seman-
tics to simulation models and hence enabling the exploration of several execution paths, a translation
from the DEVS (Discrete Event System Speciﬁcation) [77] modeling paradigm to the Z-DEVS formalism,
which combines DEVS, the Z speciﬁcation language [63] and ﬁrst order logic, is proposed in [69]. (This is
similar to translating programming languages to the input modeling languages of model checkers that was
discussed above.) The static properties of the simulation model can then be analyzed with the Z/EVES
theorem prover [53] while the temporal properties can be analyzed using a model checker.
Neural Network/Machine Learning Approaches for Validating Simulation Models In [40],
a neural network approach to the validation of simulation models is presented. Speciﬁcally, a number
of alternative simulation models train a neural network using multiple statistics (e.g., means, variances,
autocovariances, etc.). Hence, the neural network learns to identify key features of these statistics to
belong to a speciﬁc simulation model. Following that, an experiment with the real system is oﬀered to
the neural network. The network then outputs a probability vector, indicating for every simulation model
the probability that the data comes from the model. This probability vector can be used to distinguish
valid from invalid models. Another machine learning technique can be found in [41] where Martens et
al. make use of concepts from machine learning and fuzzy set theory to deﬁne a resemblance relation for
measuring the degree of similarity between the input-output transformation of a simulation model and
the corresponding input-output transformation of the real system.
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Integrated Environments for Verifying Models Examples of other software tools that provide
an integrated environment, which allows the user to both verify a model and use it to evaluate/predict
performance, are TwoTowers [11] and Maude [17, 42].
Using TwoTowers, the user models a concurrent system as an algebraic term in EMPAr [10],
which is an extension of EMPA (Extended Markovian Process Algebra) [12] allowing for the speciﬁca-
tion of performance measures based on rewards. TwoTowers has three kernels: (a) an integrated kernel
can simulate an EMPAr speciﬁcation and derive performance measures according to the well-known
method of independent replications, (b) a functional kernel generates a labeled transition system (LTS)
of the EMPAr speciﬁcation, and (c) a performance kernel generates a Markov chain of the EMPAr
speciﬁcation. A version of the Concurrency Workbench of North Carolina (CWB-NC) [18] can then
analyze the LTS using diﬀerent types of formal veriﬁcation (e.g., model checking to check temporal prop-
erties and state space exploration to check safety properties). A Markov Chain Analyzer (MarCA) [64]
can conduct stationary and transient performance analysis on the Markov chain where the performance
measures are derived using the rewards expressed in the EMPAr speciﬁcation. TwoTowers has been
used for analyzing several distributed algorithms and networking protocols such as the alternating bit
protocol, CSMA/CD, ATM switches, and QoS protocols for Internet audio [1].
Maude [42] is a reﬂective language and system that supports both equational and rewriting logic
speciﬁcation and programming. Maude can be used to create executable speciﬁcations for a wide range
of applications (e.g., other languages, theorem provers, concurrent systems). In fact, Maude can be
used to build language extensions for Maude itself. Particularly, Full Maude is implemented in Maude
as an extension of Core Maude14 [17]. Concurrent object-oriented systems can be speciﬁed in Full
Maude by means of object-oriented modules, which support objects, messages, classes and inheritance.
Object-oriented modules can then be executed and also model-checked with an on-the-ﬂy explicit-state
Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) model checker [25]. Furthermore, Real-Time Maude [47] is a language
and tool supporting the formal speciﬁcation and analysis of real-time and hybrid systems. Real-Time
Maude is implemented in Maude as an extension of Full Maude and oﬀers a wide range of analysis
techniques, including timed rewriting for simulation purposes, state space exploration to check safety
properties, and time-bounded LTL model checking. The Real-Time Maude LTL model checker has
been previously used in [46] for verifying the AER/NCA active network protocol suite [36]. In a more
recent case study, O¨lveczky and Thorvaldsen [48] use Real-Time Maude to formally model the Optimally
Geographical Density Control (OGDC) algorithm [78] for wireless sensor networks, use the Real-Time
Maude speciﬁcation to perform all the simulation experiments done by the algorithm developers using
ns-2 [67], and perform further formal analyses which are beyond the capabilities of (traditional) simulation
tools. The major diﬀerence between our work and tools such as TwoTowers and Maude is that we verify
a simulation model that is written in an imperative language (namely, Java) rather than a model that is
written in a formal speciﬁcation language.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we present the design, implementation and performance evaluation of a state space
exploration framework that enriches the set of veriﬁcation and validation tools available to network
simulation modelers and protocol designers. Our framework uses state space exploration to explore
the (entire) state space created by a network simulation model and check whether the model satisﬁes
certain safety properties that the real network protocol satisﬁes. We make use of structural properties in
14Core Maude is the Maude interpreter implemented in C++ and provides all of Maude’s basic functionality.
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the underlying state space of the protocol along two orthogonal dimensions; the ﬁrst uses a non-trivial
simulation relation to prune the states to be searched, and the second is state ranking that determines
whether a state is “better than” another in order to enable the implementation of a best-ﬁrst search
(BeFS).
We demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of our framework by verifying the simulation models of two
widely used and fairly complex network protocols: the Ad-Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV)
routing protocol for wireless ad hoc networks and the directed diﬀusion data dissemination protocol for
wireless sensor networks. Experimental results show that the state space explorer is able to ﬁnd violations
of a safety property within acceptable time and space requirements. Furthermore, BeFS heuristics that
exploit properties inherent to the network protocol and the safety property being checked can expedite
the process of ﬁnding those violations by several orders of magnitude. We study several BeFS heuristics
for both AODV and directed diﬀusion, and provide guidelines for good heuristics based on our results.
We also compare the performance of our framework to that of a state-of-the-art model checker for Java
programs, namely Java PathFinder (JPF). The results of the comparison show that our framework is
comparable to JPF in terms of the time needed to ﬁnd an assertion violation.
In future work, we intend to devise eﬃcient heuristics for each class of network protocols (e.g.,
routing protocols, MAC protocols, and transport protocols, etc.) so that if the simulation model of a
protocol belonging to a certain class is to be veriﬁed, the user can use the appropriate heuristic for that
class without having to start from scratch. In other words, the heuristics will be class-speciﬁc instead
of protocol-speciﬁc. Another avenue of future research is state similarity. In this paper, we have used
only one way of deﬁning similar states. In future work, we intend to study the performance of diﬀerent
granularities of state similarity.
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